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Recent scandals have revealed grave instances of prosecutorial misconduct on
both the state and federal level. Simply looking to publicly-known cases of
prosecutorial misconduct, these range from the national controversy over
groundless charges .filed against three Duke University lacrosse players by a
North Carolina prosecutor up for re-election,1 to the politically-motivated firings
.of nine federal prosecutors by the Bush Administration,2 to the reversal of
numerous convictions of innocent defendants based on newly-acquired DNA
evidence.3 With these news stories and others, even the public at large appears
attuned to the dangers of placing unchecked power in the hands of government
prosecutors.
1. See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike
Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEo. MASON. L. REv. 257, 284-305 (2008)
(laying out in detail the events in the Duke Lacrosse players case).
2. See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, "The U.S. Attorneys Scandal" and the Allocation of
Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHtO ST. L.J. 187, 188 (2008) (describing the 2006 firing of nine United States
Attorneys and noting that the "discharges have led to allegations that [the Department of Justice] influenced
U.S. Attorneys' Offices to pursue the President's partisan agenda by encouraging the overzealous pursuit of
voting rights cases and government corruption cases against Democrats and by discharging individual U.S.
Attorneys who resisted").
3. See generally Barry Scheck, et al., Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution and Other Dispatches From
the Wrongly Convicted 246 (2000) (analyzing sixty-two exonerations of convicted defendants obtained by the
Innocence Project at Cardozo Law School using DNA evidence and concluding that prosecutorial misconduct
was a factor in forty-two percent of the cases); see also, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a Wrongful
Conviction: Theoretical Implications and Practical Solutions, 51 VtL. L. RE',. 337, 337 (2006) (reporting that
between 1989 and 2006, "post-conviction DNA testing has exonerated 174 criminal defendants and at least
another 300 inmates have been released on grounds consistent with innocence during that period").
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To help combat such abuses, there is a legal ethics rule devoted to the "special
responsibilities" of the prosecutor, Rule 3.8. 4 But this rule, which does not
regulate anywhere near the full range of prosecutorial misconduct,5 has proved
resistant to meaningful reform. This Article considers the dynamics at play in
prosecutorial ethics reform by tracing recent modern attempts to amend Rule 3.8,
beginning with the American Bar Association's (ABA) unsuccessful review of
the prosecutorial ethics rule as part of its wide-ranging "Ethics 2000" review,
6
and concluding with the ABA's recent success in amending Rule 3.8 to
encompass the prosecutor's duty to help redress wrongful convictions. Both
suggest valuable lessons for reformers in prosecutorial ethics, where both process
and timing can be as critical as a proposal's content.
The Article begins with the ABA's "Ethics 2000" review, in which the ABA
undertook a much anticipated overhaul of its entire body of ethics rules, which
form the basic framework for regulating lawyers' ethics in the United States. 7 A
number of model rules were clarified and amended, and the Ethics 2000 process
successfully sparked a nationwide movement on the state level to review and
update state legal ethics rules.8 Insofar as prosecutorial ethics are concerned,
however, the Ethics 2000 process was a grave disappointment to many
observers. 9
Although the ABA undertook to review its entire body of model ethics rules to
encourage "uniformity" in state ethics rules and address "new issues and
questions,"1° it chose to make no changes to Rule 3.8, the rule governing the
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 3.8 (2007) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
5. See infra notes 13 to 16 (and accompanying text).
6. See generally Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:
Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441 (2002) (summarizing the amendments to the
ABA model ethics rules resulting from the work of the "Ethics 2000" Commission, formally known as the
American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct). The Ethics
2000 amendments were actually adopted by the ABA in February of 2002.
7. Id.
8. Every State has initiated a review of its own ethics rules in light of the changes made by the ABA to the
Model Rules during Ethics 2000. As of July 2008, thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have completed
that process and put new rules in place. See http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jclr/ethics_2000-status-chart.pdf
(providing an Ethics 2000 implementation status chart current as of July 23, 2008, with links to state ethics
rules).
9. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, ARarrRARY JusTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR at 153-54
(2007) (finding it "troubling" that the "ABA chose to pass on the opportunity to provide [guidance on
prosecutorial ethics] during its last revision of the Model Rules"); Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics As
Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv, 1573, 1575 (2003) (concluding that the decision of the Ethics 2000 Commission not
to supplement the prosecutorial ethics rule "could only have been motivated by political and procedural
considerations ... since its inaction cannot be explained on substantive grounds"); Ellen Yaroshefsky, It is ime
to Take Prosecutorial Discipline Seriously, 8 U.D.C. L. REv. 275, 288 (2004) (finding it "unfortunate" that the
Ethics 2000 Commission declined to revise Model Rule 3.8 although it was fully aware of the criticisms of the
current rules for prosecutors).
10. ABA Comm. on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Chair's Introduction (2002)
[hereinafter Ethics 2000].
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"special responsibilities of a prosecutor,"" despite evident flaws and omissions
in the rule. While the ethical challenges for prosecutors are complex and varied,
the prosecutorial ethics rule touched on only a few of the prosecutor's ethical
duties and had been criticized as incomplete and inadequate.
1 2
Rule 3.8 failed, for example, to deal explicitly with any of the special ethical
challenges posed by the two major arenas in which a modem prosecutor operates
- investigating crime and negotiating guilty pleas - areas in which the
prosecutor's ethical duties are not adequately addressed by the ethics rules
applicable to lawyers more generally. Meanwhile, Rule 3.8 set a minimal
standard of probable cause for prosecuting criminal charges, 13 and failed to set
any ethical limits other than probable cause on the exercise of the prosecutor's
broad discretion to charge crimes. 14 The ABA's prosecutorial ethics rule was
justly criticized for being at once incomplete and vague.15
Yet the Ethics 2000 Commission decided against supplementing or clarifying
the rule. In the words of one commentator, in terms of prosecutorial ethics, the
Commission "decided to err on the side of conservatism rather than comprehen-
siveness."16 The Commission reissued the rule, with no substantive additions,
and made one change to the commentary accompanying Rule 3.8 that arguably
watered down its effect. 17
As part of the Ethics 2000 process, shortly before the Commission was due to
meet to consider Rule 3.8, I was asked if I would prepare a report for the
Commission summarizing the degree to which Rule 3.8 had been implemented in
11. MODEL RULES, R. 3.8.
12. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 616
(1999) (asserting that the disciplinary rules "barely scratch.the surface" in terms of laying out the prosecutor's
professional responsibilities); Ellen Yaroshefsky, It is Time to Take Prosecutorial Discipline Seriously, 8
U.D.C. L. REV. 275, 286 (2004) (noting that Model Rule 3.8 is "far from comprehensive"). See generally
Monroe Freeman & Abbe Smith, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS ETfics, (2004).
13. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR at 147-48
(2007) (arguing that if prosecutors are allowed to bring charges on the "minimal standard of probable cause," a
far lower standard than the prosecutor will have to meet at trial, it increases the potential that the charging power
will be used improperly).
14. Cf., e.g., D.C. R. PROF. CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (providing that a prosecutor shall not "in exercising discretion
to investigate or to prosecute, improperly favor or invidiously discriminate against any person").
15. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR at 150-51
(2007) (arguing that the inadequacy of Model Rule 3.8 "lies not only in its failure to address critical issues but
also in the vagueness of its language"); Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics As Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv.,
1573, 1575 (2003) ("[T]here is no principled reason for a disciplinary code to include only the particular
provisions now included in Model Rule 3.8.").
16. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics As Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1573, 1586 (2003).
17. Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT: Summary of the Work of
Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmCS 441, 469 (2002) (explaining that the Ethics 2000 Commission "made no
substantive changes in the text of' Rule 3.8 and omitted from the commentary a reference to the disclosure
obligations of a prosecutor in connection with grand jury proceedings).
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the States, and the interpretive issues that had arisen.18 In the Report, I sought to
present a "balanced view of the issues" as background for the Commission,
taking into account other bodies of standards issued by the ABA and other
organizations. 19 The Report provides a comprehensive snapshot of ABA Model
Rule 3.8 as it then existed in 1999 - and captures a sense as well of the combative
atmosphere that then surrounded the topic of prosecutorial ethics.
20
My Report highlighted interpretive issues under Rule 3.8, suggesting certain
limited modifications to the existing rule.21 Equally importantly, it laid out
numerous ethical duties recognized by other bodies but not included in the ABA's
prosecutorial ethics rule, from the prosecutor's duty not to invidiously discrimi-
nate in selecting targets for investigation, to her duty not to use criminal charges
as leverage to induce defendants to settle civil claims (and many other duties as
well).22 The Report cautioned, however, that a thoughtful and inclusive process -
with input from judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel - would be needed to
effectively reform the ABA's prosecutorial ethics rule.23 Whether because of the
Report or in spite of it, the Ethics 2000 Commission ultimately decided neither to
amend the Rule nor to appoint a Task Force on prosecutorial ethics, punting the
issue - to the disappointment of many observers.24
Only six years after this disappointing conclusion to the Ethics 2000 process,
the ABA recently adopted the first major amendment to Rule 3.8 in many years.
In February of 2008, it amended the model rule to recognize the prosecutor's
ethical duty to help rectify wrongful convictions of innocent persons. New
provisions explain the steps a prosecutor must take when faced with evidence that
suggests or establishes that a convicted defendant did not commit the crime
charged. These new duties are the most important additions to Rule 3.8 since
18. See Niki Kuckes, Report to the ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
Concerning Rule 3.8 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
(Dec. 1, 1999) (unpublished report is attached as Appendix A).
19. Id. at 1 n.1. While I was then serving as Chair of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards Committee, the
report was not a Standards Committee project (nor could it have been, given the short time available when the
Report was requested).
20. Id. at 4-7 (highlighting debates over the Justice Department's position that the ethics rules cannot be
applied to federal prosecutors, and related controversies).
21. Most importantly, the Report concluded that the ethical standard for initiating and maintaining a
prosecution - the probable cause standard - was unduly low. Id. at 14-15.
22. Id. at 35-42 (noting that some of the ethical duties omitted from Rule 3.8 are more significant than those
included).
23. Id. at 42.
24. While some observers credit the cautionary tone of my Report with influencing the Ethics 2000
Commission not to undertake reform, I suspect that the far larger factor reflected both in my Report and the
Commission's decision was the lack of any evident base of support in the criminal justice community for
undertaking major reform of the prosecutorial ethics rule as part of Ethics 2000, coupled with the certain
opposition of the Justice Department.
25. See CRIMNAL JUSTICE SECrIoN, AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT 105B TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 2008)
[hereinafter ABA Report 105B] (proposing a resolution, approved by the ABA in February of 2008, to add
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the adoption of the Model Code in 1969, when the ABA first laid out the two basic
duties that form the backbone of the current rule - the bar on prosecuting
groundless criminal charges and the prosecutor's duty to produce exculpatory
evidence.26
This amendment, moreover, was generated by a distinctly different process
than either the Ethics 2000 process or the routine ethics rule amendment process.
Amendments to the ethics rules usually originate from the ABA's Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, which is the entity within
the ABA tasked with developing model ethics rules and issuing ethics opinions.27
Instead, this change found its seeds in reforms initiated at the state and local level
- in reforms undertaken by the New York State Bar and the Bar of the City of
New York - which inspired a subcommittee within the Criminal Justice Section
to propose changes to the ethics rules. 28 In important ways, this reflects a new -
and more successful - model of amending the prosecutorial ethics rules.
This Article picks up where my Report left off, tracking attempts to reform
Rule 3.8 from Ethics 2000 to the present day. If the Report provided a snapshot of
where prosecutorial ethics rules stood in 1999, this Article provides the frame to
place that snapshot in current context. It explains how we went from the nadir for
prosecutorial ethics in 1999, when the prospects for meaningful change in Rule
3.8 were slim, to the successful adoption this year of the first major change in the
prosecutorial ethics rules in many years - indeed, in many decades.
First, the Article considers the events that led the Ethics 2000 Commission to
reissue the prosecutorial ethics rule without substantive change, despite evident
problems with the rule, analyzing the lessons to be drawn from the impasse.
Second, the Article tracks subsequent developments in the States as they
implemented Ethics 2000. It reaches the surprising conclusion that Ethics 2000
served to influence prosecutorial ethics rules in the field, even though the model
rule itself was not improved, arguably validating the views of some who
lamented the lost opportunity to reform Rule 3.8 as part of the Ethics 2000
process. Finally, the Article looks to the future with greater optimism. The Ethics
2000 review also served to spark State-initiated reforms that, in turn, have created
a positive dialogue among local, state, and national bar authorities. Such
Model Rule 3.8(g) and (h), setting forth new ethical duties concerning a prosecutor who becomes aware of
evidence suggesting or establishing that a convicted defendant did not commit the crime charged).
26. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY, DR 7-103(A) & 103(B) (1969). While the ethical limitation
on issuing subpoenas to defense counsel, adopted in 1990, also concerns an important investigative issue,
particularly on the federal level, the new ethical duty to rectify wrongful convictions has broad application
nationwide and goes to the heart of the prosecutor's basic duty to "do justice."
27. See Am. Bar Ass'n Center for Prof'l, Standing Comm. On Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/committees/scepr.htnl (last visited Nov. 13, 2008) (describing the Ethics Commit-
tee's responsibilities).
28. ABA Report 105B, supra note 25 at 3 (describing the background to the amendments to Rule 3.8
concerning wrongful convictions).
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"ground-up" efforts led directly to the ABA's recent success in amending Rule
3.8 to add the prosecutor's ethical duty to remedy wrongful convictions - and
present a new model of rules reform that promises to bear more fruit.
I. LESSONS FROM THE FAILURE TO AMEND RULE 3.8 IN ETmIcs 2000
While the Ethics 2000 process may have been a disappointment, given the
ABA's seeming lack of political will to tackle prosecutorial ethics, it was also a
telling example of the challenges of regulating prosecutors through state legal
ethics rules. Rule 3.8 is unique insofar as it singles out a group of lawyers,
prosecutors, engaged in a particular type of law practice.29 Regulating prosecuto-
rial ethics presents special challenges, both because the rules are targeted at and
tend to antagonize a powerful lobby, and because political sensitivity inevitably
accompanies any efforts to regulate law enforcement. Scholars have often noted
the dynamic that makes it difficult, in American political culture, to overcome the
emotional power of objections worded in terms of law enforcement impera-
tives. 30 That dynamic was clearly one of the forces at play in the Ethics 2000
process.
As laid out below, the Ethics 2000 experience demonstrated starkly the
difficulty of transforming critiques of the prosecutorial ethics rules into
meaningful reform.
A. THE ABA'S ETHICS 2000 PROJECT
The Ethics 2000 process was the most recent major step in a long history of
involvement by the ABA in formulating national standards for lawyers' ethics.
The ABA has been remarkably influential in shaping state legal ethics rules
across the United States through its sets of model rules. 31 The organization has
periodically amended its rules to clarify and refine ethical doctrines and reflect
changing legal practice. The "Ethics 2000" process, initiated in 1997, was one
such landmark review.
32
29. See, e.g., Hans P. Sinha, Prosecutorial Ethics: The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Material, 42
PROSECUTOR 20, 20 (2008) ("[Rule 3.8] is also the only rule drafted specifically for one segment of the
profession. Significantly, there are no special rules for criminal defense lawyers, tax lawyers or corporate
lawyers, or any other type of lawyers."). while prosecutors are also subject to the ethics rules that govern all
lawyers (such as the duty of candor to the court, confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and so on), Rule 3.8
concerns the "special" duties of a prosecutor that rise above those of lawyers in other types of practice.
30. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 534
(2001) (emphasizing that there is a "natural alliance" between the interests of prosecutors and elected legislators
that "makes prosecutors (along with police) a very powerful lobby on criminal law issues").
31. The first set of ABA ethics rules were the Canons of Professional Ethics, issued in 1908. See ABA
CANONS OF PROF'L ETIscs (1908) [hereinafter 1908 CANONS].
32. Prior comprehensive reviews resulted in major revisions of the ABA's model rules. In 1969, the ABA
completed a comprehensive review of the 1908 Canons, which had come to be criticized as "generalizations
designed for an earlier era," and replaced them with an entirely new set of rules, the ABA Model Code of
2009]
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Prior to Ethics 2000, the ABA's Model Rules had been amended piece-meal
over the years since their adoption in 1983. By 1997, the States varied quite
significantly in the degree to which they had adopted the ABA's current version
of the Model Rules, were using older versions of the Model Rules, had never
converted from the out-dated Model Code, or had created their own sui generis
variations.33 A primary motivation behind the ABA's decision to initiate the
project was the "growing disparity in state ethics codes," which led to an
undesirable lack of uniformity. 34 To review and update the Model Rules, and
ensure that they reflected the changing ethical challenges of modem law practice,
the ABA created the body popularly known as the "Ethics 2000" Commission.
The Commission's task was to complete a comprehensive ethics rules review and
report back to the ABA, recommending changes.
The Ethics 2000 Commission decided early on to take an approach that would
be "comprehensive, but at the same time conservative, and recommend change
only where necessary. 36 Applying the motto "if it ain't broke, don't fix it," the
Commission set as its goal a minimalist approach to recommending revisions.37
While some have questioned whether the Commission generally succeeded in
this aim, 38 with respect to Rule 3.8 - the subject of this Article - the
Commission's approach to Rule 3.8 was minimalist to a fault. Some possible
explanations for the ABA's hands-off approach to the subject of prosecutorial
ethics in Ethics 2000 are explored further below.
B. COMMISSIONING A BACKGROUND REPORT ON RULE 3.8
In anticipation of the Ethics 2000 Commission's review of Rule 3.8, in the Fall
of 1999 the Commission decided, as noted, to solicit a report summarizing the
degree to which Rule 3.8 had been implemented in the states, identifying state
variations, and analyzing the issues that had arisen in interpretation of the rule.
My report was completed and submitted to the Commission in early December,
in anticipation of the meeting at which the Commission was scheduled to
Professional Responsibility. See MODEL CODE, Preface (quoting Justice Harlan Fiske Stone). The Model Code,
in turn, was replaced in 1983 by the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a new body of rules quite
different in form and content than the Model Code. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr, Chair's
Introduction. The Ethics 2000 process, described above, undertook a comprehensive review of the Model Rules.
33. See Ethics 2000, supra note 10 (also noting that lack of uniformity was exacerbated by numerous
amendments to the Rules since 1983).
34. Id.
35. To become effective, changes to the Model Rules must be approved by the ABA's House of Delegates, a
representative body that governs the ABA.
36. See Ethics 2000, supra note 10.
37. Id. (noting that "we tried to keep our changes to a minimum").
38. See Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT: Summary of the Work of
Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHcs 441, 442-43 (2002) (noting that while the Commission's "presumptive
operating principle was to make no change unless substantively necessary," as time went along it seemed that
"more and more fell into this category").
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consider the prosecutorial ethics rule.
The task, as I understood it, was to prepare a neutral, balanced, factual study of
Rule 3.8 as it was then in place in the states, in order to provide background
information for the Commission. Unlike the report of, for example, a Task Force,
my role was not to initiate major changes in the Rules, or to act as an advocate for
any particular group, but to provide a neutral fact-based assessment of the degree
of implementation of the current rule and related interpretive issues. The limited
nature of this task is reflected in the Report.39
At that time (and following Ethics 2000), Model Rule 3.8 established only six
specific ethical principles. To paraphrase the essential elements of each, the rule
established:
1. A minimum ethical standard for prosecuting criminal charges (probable
cause) (Rule 3.8(a));
2. A prosecutor's duty to ensure the accused has been informed of and had the
opportunity to exercise the right to counsel (Rule 3.8(b));
3. An ethical bar on seeking waivers of important pretrial rights from an
accused who has not yet had counsel appointed (Rule 3.8(c));
4. A prosecutor's duty to disclose to the defense known evidence that would
tend to negate guilt, reduce the offense, or mitigate the punishment of the
accused (Rule 3.8(d));
5. A heightened standard for issuing subpoenas seeking testimony from
lawyers about client information, (then denominated as Rule 3.8(f)); 40 and
6. Ethical restrictions concerning prejudicial out-of-court statements, includ-
ing a prosecutor's duty to use reasonable care to prevent investigators and
police from making statements that would be ethically barred if issued by the
prosecutor (then denominated as Rule 3.8(e)) and, logically related, an ethical
bar on out-of-court statements by the prosecutor that tend to "heighten public
condemnation" of the accused (then denominated as Rule 3.8(g)). 4
1
My Report canvassed each of these provisions, assessed the degree to which
they had been implemented in the States, and discussed the interpretive issues
that had arisen. I found that the original version of Rule 3.8, as adopted in 1983,
39. See Appendix A at I n. 1 (noting that the Report "is not intended to be an advocacy piece on behalf of any
particular constituency"). Indeed, because I was then in private practice at a criminal defense firm, I was
particularly conscious of trying not to inject my personal views into the report, or to argue from the perspective
of the defense bar.
40. The ethical restrictions on subpoenas to lawyers originally appeared as Rule 3.8(f), but in the Ethics 2000
review, this duty was renumbered Rule 3.8(e).
41. These duties were originally listed in separate sections (Rule 3.8(g) and (e), respectively), but the Ethics
2000 Commission decided to combine both duties into new subsection (f) in the current Rule, renumbering the
lawyer subpoena rule as Rule 3.8(e).
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had been implemented in close to two-thirds of the states,42 but that the later
amendments to Rule 3.8 had only rarely been adopted.43
Equally importantly, research for the Report revealed that the ethical duties
included in Rule 3.8 were incomplete. The Report documented a wide array of
additional ethical principles established in other sources but not included in the
ABA's Model Rules, observing that the ethical obligations spelled out in Rule 3.8
often seem less significant than those omitted. 44 The rule did not spell out, for
example, the important question of the prosecutor's relationship with the grand
jury, an issue addressed at length in the D.C. Bar's ethics rules, among other
standards.45 Nor did it address plea bargaining practices that are ethically
problematic, such as overcharging in order to increase a prosecutor's leverage in
plea negotiations, or so-called "release-dismissal agreements," an ethically
problematic practice in which prosecutors agree to drop (or not to file) criminal
charges in exchange for the defendant's agreement not to seek civil damages.46
Numerous other examples abounded.
At the same time, my Report expressed serious concern as to whether the
Ethics 2000 process would be a suitable forum to ensure the thorough, thoughtful
review necessary to ensure successful adoption and acceptance by the interested
groups.47 It recommended that the Commission not undertake any major reform
to the rule in committee. It urged, instead, that if the Commission decided to
address the fundamental problems in the ABA's prosecutorial ethics rule more
broadly, it should initiate an inclusive and thoughtful pr6cess that would reach
out to the leadership of the criminal justice community.48
To my knowledge, the Report is the most thorough analysis available that
addresses state implementation of Rule 3.8. It has been widely cited in the
42. As issued in 1983, Rule 3.8 consisted of five provisions, which had been adopted quite widely in the
States. See Appendix A at 12-27 (finding that Rule 3.8(a) had been adopted verbatim in thirty-five states, Rule
3.8(b) had been adopted verbatim in thirty-four states, Rule 3.8(c) had been adopted verbatim in thirty-one
states, Rule 3.8(d) had been adopted verbatim in thirty-one states, and Rule 3.8(e) had been adopted verbatim in
twenty-eight states). These figures include the states that adopted the Model Rules verbatim; a number of
additional states adopted variations of these rules.
43. See id. at 29 (finding that Rule 3.8(f) (added by the ABA in 1990) had been adopted in some form in ten
states); id. at 34 (finding that Rule 3.8(g) (added by the ABA in 1994) had been adopted in only three states).
44. See Appendix A at 39 (agreeing with observers who have noted that "some of the prosecutor's obligations
not detailed in the rule ... are more significant than some of the obligations that are included in Rule 3.8").
45. See Appendix A at 35-37 (explaining the rationale on which standard-setting groups have urged that the
prosecutor's ethical duties in presenting evidence to the grand jury should exceed constitutional requirements,
and should include a duty to present exculpatory evidence).
46. See id. at 40.
47. Id. at 3.
48. My report recommended, in particular, that any overall review of Rule 3.8 be "undertaken over a period
of time with participation from the ground up from all of the groups involved," to ensure acceptance among
prosecutors, defense counsel, and the courts (and adoption by the states). Appendix A at 3.
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literature on prosecutorial ethics.49 Until now, however, the report has not been
available in print. In light of increasing interest in prosecutorial ethics, and the
ongoing efforts within the ABA to amend Rule 3.8, The Georgetown Journal of
Legal Ethics has graciously agreed to publish the Report to the Ethics 2000
Commission along with this Article.
Where my original report to the Ethics 2000 Commission left off, this Article
begins below by reviewing the debates before the Commission concerning
potential amendments to Rule 3.8 - debates that led to the ABA's ultimate
decision to leave the rule virtually intact.
C. THE ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION AND THE PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS
RULE
While it is self-evident that the Ethics 2000 Commission decided not to take on
prosecutorial ethics, the legislative history explaining its rationale is notably
sparse. 50 The Commission's decision not to undertake reform of the prosecutorial
ethics rule - or appoint a Task Force to do so - is essentially a black box.
Experts in prosecutorial ethics have expressed extreme frustration at the
missed opportunity, in Ethics 2000, for a comprehensive review of prosecutorial
ethics rules as part of the process of updating the Model Rules more broadly. 5 1 In
retrospect, however, it was scarcely surprising that the Commission's review
came to naught. There was, to begin with, no one at the table to persuade the
Commission that reform of the prosecutorial ethics rule had broad support. The
Ethics 2000 Commission itself was not a body of criminal justice experts, but a
group of distinguished judges and lawyers charged broadly with reviewing the
entire body of ethical rules applicable to lawyers in any type of practice.5 2
At that time, no group was actively seeking to expand upon the duties in Rule
3.8. Amazingly enough in retrospect, during Ethics 2000, no interested body of
lawyers or public interest group had organized around the issue of prosecutorial
49. Given the increasing interest in prosecutorial ethics reform, the Report has been relied on by a range of
groups and individuals. It has been used by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and was
extensively cited in Professor Davis's recent award-winning book, Arbitrary Justice, as well as in numerous law
review articles. According to the ABA, it has been one of the most requested items from the Ethics 2000 archive.
50. See Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr: Summary of the Work of
Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 441, 469 (2002) (providing a one-paragraph explanation of the Ethics
2000 Commission's decisions to make no substantive change in Rule 3.8).
51. See supra note 10.
52. The membership of the Ethics 2000 Commission included a state supreme court chief justice, a federal
circuit court judge, a state court trial judge, a retired judge who is also a former dean and law professor, two
professors of legal ethics (one of whom was the principal drafter of the Model Rules), a lawyer formerly with the
Department of Justice, several private practitioners, a former in-house counsel, and a nonlawyer member (a
former college president and member of many corporate boards). See Charlotte Stretch, "Overview of Ethics
2000 Commission and Report" (2002) (type of document not really clear, on ABA website). Apparently, there
were no members specifically-appointed because of their perspective as prosecutors or defense counsel.
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ethics reform.5 3 When the Ethics 2000 Commission held eight public hearings
across the United States to solicit comments about its ethics review, not a single
speaker addressed Rule 3.8. No formal proposals were put on the table by any
interest group or bar organization to amend the rule. Only a handful of bar
associations and commentators even raised concerns about it.55 Despite academic
critiques,56 dissatisfaction with Rule 3.8 clearly had not then materialized into
any effective movement to seek reform in the ABA's prosecutorial ethics rule.
At the same time - and likely related - it was evident to anyone who regularly
read the legal news that the Justice Department was vociferously opposed to key
aspects of the ABA's prosecutorial ethics rules. At the time of Ethics 2000, a
heated, decades-long dispute had run over the extent to which Justice Department
prosecutors can be subjected to state ethical rules and disciplinary procedures.57
The Justice Department had taken the position that state ethics rules in general -
and the "no contact" rule in particular58 -could not lawfully be applied to federal
prosecutors who participate in questioning represented witnesses.59
Only a year earlier, in October of 1998, Congress had passed the "McDade
Amendment," resolving the issue by providing explicitly that federal prosecutors
must follow "State laws and rules.., governing attorneys" in each state where
prosecutors practice, 60 but the Department was still firmly opposed to the notion
that federal prosecutors, engaged in the competitive and critical enterprise of
criminal law enforcement, could be regulated by state ethics rules.
Some flavor of this debate is captured in my Report, which lays out the history
of the dispute (and related litigation) generated by the Justice Department's
53. See Appendix A at 3; see also Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573,
1583 ("No ABA entity or major organization representing prosecutors or criminal defense lawyers sought
changes to Rule 3.8.").
54. Public hearings were held by the Ethics 2000 Commission as follows: February 16 and 17, 2001 (in San
Diego); July 6, 2000 (in New York); June 2, 2000 (in New Orleans); February 10, 2000 (in Dallas); August 5,
1999 (in Atlanta); June 4, 1999 (in La Jolla); February 4, 1999 (in Los Angeles); and March 29, 1998 (in
Montreal, in connection with the ABA's annual National Conference on Professional Responsibility).
55. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. 1l. L. Rev. 1573, 1583 ("Only a handful of bar
associations and individual attorneys, of whom I was one, raised concerns about [Rule 3.8].").
56. See, e.g., Appendix A at 3, n. 4 (citing a sample of the academic literature on prosecutorial ethics, as of
1999, that criticized the lack of effective discipline against prosecutors).
57. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics As Usual, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev, 1573, 1582 (2003) (noting
that the Ethics 2000 Commission "waded into a roiling controversy regarding Rule 4.2," a problem the
Commission discussed "over the course of two decades").
58. See MODEL RULES R. 4.2 (stating the general rule that in "representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the substance of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter," subject to limited exceptions).
59. See generally Appendix A at 4-8 (summarizing developments); see also, e.g., Rory K. Little, Who Should
Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65 FotRDHAm L. REV. 355 (1996) (addressing the question what
legal body should regulate the ethics of federal prosecutors); Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the
Ethics of Federal Prosecutors, or Who Should Regulate the Regulators?: Response to Little, 65 FoRDHAm L.
REV. 429 (1996) (responding to Professor Little's article).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 530B.
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campaign, and notes the "high degree of flux in this area caused by recent
political and legal developments., 61 As this hints, there was at the time of Ethics
2000 an unusually vitriolic relationship between Department of Justice represen-
tatives and representatives of the organized bar. The Department's combative
position undoubtedly carried over to and influenced the Ethics 2000 process.
While it may seem odd that the United States Department of Justice - a federal
agency that handles a small, if important, share of cases nationally - should have
a significant say in formulating State ethics rules, in recent years the Department
has taken a keen interest in attempts to regulate prosecutorial ethics. The
Department has proved a powerful force whose opposition is not easily
overcome. This dynamic was clearly at work in Ethics 2000. The Justice
Department's opposition effectively doomed efforts to reform Rule 4.2,62 and
cast a long shadow over the Commission's consideration of Rule 3.8.
At various points in the process, the Ethics 2000 Commission made tentative
moves toward strengthening the prosecutor's special ethical duties under Rule
3.8. In one instance, the Commission agreed to add language to make clear that
the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence (embodied in Rule 3.8(d))
covers not only evidence that negates guilt directly but also "evidence that tends
to impeach a government witness. '6 3 At another point, the Commission agreed to
spell out expressly the prosecutors' duty to present exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury. It voted to replace a cryptic reference in the Commentary64 with new
text in the black-letter rule expressly stating that prosecutors have an ethical duty
"in presenting a case to a grand jury, to bring to the attention of the grand jury
material facts tending substantially to negate the existence of probable cause.
Both decisions were promptly reversed, however, when the Commission ran
into objections from federal and state prosecutors. 66 Indeed, the net result was
61. See Appendix A at 3.
62. See generally Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics As Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV, 1573, 1582-83 (2003)
(summarizing the Ethics 2000 Commission's unsuccessful attempt to work with the Justice Department to agree
on reforms to Rule 4.2).
63. See Proposed Rule 3.8 - Draft No. 2 (January 26, 2000); see also COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCr, AM. BAR ASSN., MEETING MmUas (December 10 to 12, 1999) (noting Commission
consensus to add reference to impeachment evidence in Rule 3.8(d)).
64. The relevant language stated: "See also Rule 3.3(d), governing ex parte proceedings, among which grand
jury proceedings are included." MODEL RULES R. 3.8, cmt. [1] (1983). This reference suggested, but did not
clearly state, that in seeking an indictment the prosecutor has a duty to make a balanced presentation of the
material facts to the grand jury (as in ex parte proceedings generally). See MODEL RULES R. 3.3(d) ("In an ex
parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the
tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.").
65. See Proposed Rule 3.8 - Draft No. 2 (January 26, 2000); see also COMNSSION ON EVALUATION OF RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr, AM. BAR ASSN., MEETING MINUTES (December 11 to 12, 1999) (noting that after
some discussion, the proposal to add new (e), establishing a rule on presenting exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury, was passed by a 5 to 1 vote).
66. See COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, AM. BAR ASSN., MEETING
MINUTES (February 11 to 13, 2000) (noting comments of the National District Attorneys' Association objecting
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that Rule 3.8 was actually weakened, since the Commission removed its
newly-drafted section (e) (which would have expressly required a prosecutor to
present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury) without reinstating the original,
oblique reference to grand jury proceedings in the Commentary, which had
suggested (though not spelled out) that such an ethical duty would apply.67
Clearly, the Commission was reluctant to tinker with Rule 3.8 to improve the rule
in the face of opposition from prosecutors.68
At the same time, the Commission did resist pressure by the Justice
Department to weaken the existing duties spelled out in Rule 3.8. At Commission
meetings, for example, the Department repeatedly proposed eliminating the
restrictions on issuing criminal subpoenas to defense lawyers. The Commission
rejected this proposal each time.69 Despite the controversy over the requirement,
it retained the lawyer subpoena provision in the rule.7 °
Similarly, a federal prosecutor initially persuaded the Ethics 2000 Commission
to water down the prosecutor's duty to take reasonable care to prevent prejudicial
public statements made by law enforcement. 71 At a later meeting, however, the
to the grand jury provision, as well as comments from a meeting observer concerning Justice Department policy
on presenting exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); see also Letter from Stuart VanMeveren, President,
NDAA, to ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (February 9, 2000) (letter on
behalf of local prosecutors "strenuously object[ing]" to the proposed rule on presenting exculpatory evidence to
the grand jury).
67. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics As Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV, 1573, 1581 (describing the
omission of the reference in the Rule 3.8(d) Commentary to grand jury proceedings as an amendment "that
eased the burden on prosecutors"). Notably, when the Reporter originally suggested simply deleting this
reference without adding any language to the black letter, no one on the Commission was willing to second the
motion. See COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr, AM. BAR ASSN., MEETING
MiturEs (December 11 to 12, 1999) (reporting on Commission's initial discussion of grand jury issue).
68. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr, AM. BAR ASSN., MEETING
MINuTES (December 11 to 12, 1999) (rejecting Reporter's proposal to add to Rule 3.8(a) language to clarify that
a prosecutor must refrain both from prosecuting "or maintaining" charges that a prosecutor knows are not
supported by probable cause).
69. See CoMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr, AM. BAR ASSN., MEETING
MINtrrES (December 11 to 12, 1999) (noting objection by federal prosecutor and reporting Commission vote to
retain the current Model Rule on lawyer subpoenas); COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDucr, AM. BAR ASSN., MEETING MINUTES (July 7 to 8, 2000) (reporting that the Commission disagreed with
the suggestion of the Justice Department to delete the lawyer subpoena rule).
70. Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT: Summary of the Work of Ethics
2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 441,469 (2002) (noting that the Commission "retained a controversial limitation
on the issuance of subpoenas to defense counsel").
71. See COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, AM. BAR ASSN., MEETING
MINUTEs (December 11 to 12, 1999) (Ethics 2000 Committee agrees to proposal by one disciplinary prosecutor
to amend Rule 3.8(e) to cover only those under the direct supervision of the prosecutor); Proposed Rule 3.8 -
Draft No. 2 (January 26, 2000) (changing language concerning supervision of out-of-court statements by
investigators to provide that the ethical duty only extends to the statements of "persons under the direct
supervision of the prosecutor").
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Commission decided to reinstate the original language. 72 While clearly con-
cerned about criticism from prosecutors, the Commission was also apparently
sensitive to the negative signal that would be sent by weakening the established
black-letter duties in Rule 3.8.
In the end, the Commission backtracked from its limited attempt to improve
Rule 3.8, and the Rule was simply reworked in format (though not in
substance). 73 In the rush of the Commission's business - and the controversy
over the "no contact" rule - the path of least resistance was clearly to leave Rule
3.8 as is, rather than undertake needed reforms in prosecutorial ethics.
In short, as anticipated, the Ethics 2000 process did not prove well-suited to a
comprehensive, thoughtful, successful amendment of the prosecutorial ethics
rules. The factors simply did not bode well: The strong opposition of the Justice
Department and state prosecutors to supplementing Rule 3.8 (and the Depart-
ment's active attempts to eliminate provisions of the rule); the Ethics 2000
Commission's negative experience in trying to amend Rule 4.2 over the
Department's opposition; the general controversy then surrounding the prosecu-
torial ethics rules; the lack of any organized voice advocating to strengthen and
supplement Rule 3.8; the diverse make-up of the Commission; and the
Commission's broad and ambitious project and limited time frame. Given these
factors, it is perhaps no surprise that the Ethics 2000 process did not produce
major change in the ABA's prosecutorial ethics rule. Indeed, it might be
considered a victory that Rule 3.8 emerged intact - including the restrictions on
issuing subpoenas to defense lawyers.
At the same time, the experience suggests at least two keys to a more
successful amendment process for the prosecutorial ethics rules. The Commis-
sion was handicapped in reviewing Rule 3.8 both by the lack of time for the
complex issues raised by the rule (and breadth of its overall task) and by the
membership's lack of depth in criminal ethics issues. When opposition arose
from the prosecutorial bar, there was a natural tendency to defer to the concerns
of law enforcement. This experience highlighted two key factors: (1) the need for
a working group experienced in and focused on the ethical challenges of criminal
law practice; and (2) the critical need to bring into the process, and bring on board
the leadership of state and federal prosecutorial groups (or at least neutralize their
72. See COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF RUi.Es OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr, AM. BAR ASSN., MEETING
MINUTEs (July 7 to 8, 2000) (reinstating the original language concerning prosecutor's duty to prevent unethical
statements by investigators).
73. In particular, the substance of the black-letter rule was unchanged. However, the duties previously found
in Rule 3.8(e) (on supervising investigators' public statements) and Rule 3.8(g) (on the prosecutor's duty to
refrain from statements that heighten public condemnation) were combined and renumbered as new Rule 3.8(f).
The duty previously contained in Rule 3.8(f) (on lawyer subpoenas) was renumbered as new Rule 3.8(e). (As
noted, the reference to grand jury proceedings was also omitted from Commentary). See generally MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCr as Adopted by ABA House of Delegates (Ethics 2000) (February 2002) (redlined
version), available at http://www.abanet.orglcpr/e2kle2k-redline.html.
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opposition). The Ethics 2000 experience suggested, not surprisingly, that the
process of amending the rules is as important as the substance to the success of
the endeavor - and that the prosecutorial ethics rules in particular are highly
specialized rules with sensitive political aspects, not well-suited to a routine
review process.
Nonetheless, ironically perhaps, it turned out that Ethics 2000 did influence
State prosecutorial ethics rules, as later developments showed. Developments in
the States in the years since Ethics 2000 are reviewed below.
II. STATE REFORMS IN PROSECUTORIAL ETHics AFTER ETHIcs 2000
While the Ethics 2000 Commission did not change Rule 3.8, the Ethics 2000
process nonetheless influenced the shape of state prosecutorial ethics rules to a
surprising extent. This effect took several forms.
To begin with, the very fact that the ABA undertook Ethics 2000 induced many
state bodies that had not reviewed their ethics rules in a number of years to
undertake a comprehensive review of their own ethics rules overall.74 In the wake
of Ethics 2000, this national impetus led every State to update or revisit their
versions of Rule 3.8 (among other rules). In this way, the ABA's project was
successful in enhancing the influence of Model Rule 3.8 - and moving toward the
ABA's stated goal of increasing uniformity with the national prosecutorial ethics
standard-even if the standards themselves remained limited in scope.
Equally importantly, the Ethics 2000 review also prompted certain leadership
states - most notably Wisconsin, New York, and North Carolina - to engage in
thoughtful broader efforts to improve upon their own prosecutorial ethics rules,
providing leadership from the bottom up that in turn served to influence the
ABA. 75 One of these efforts - the proposal of the New York State bar to articulate
the prosecutor's ethical duty when faced with evidence of a wrongful conviction
- led directly to the ABA's recent landmark decision to incorporate this ethical
duty in the national model rules. This process also energized the criminal practice
bar to consider and initiate member-driven reforms in the prosecutorial ethics
rules, described more fully below. This positive dialogue promises to reap further
benefits in coming years.
In short, even though the ABA decided itself against making any improve-
74. While the ABA did not amend Rule 3.8, it did amend many of the other Model Rules. A redlined version
of the ABA rules is available at: http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-report-home.html.
75. Interestingly, the District of Columbia bar, which in 1999 had been on the forefront of prosecutorial
ethics with its forward-thinking version of Rule 3.8, made virtually no changes to its version of the rle. See
District of Columbia Bar, Rules of Professional Conduct Review Committee, Proposed Amendments to the
District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct: Final Report and Recommendations at 144 (June 21, 2005,
revised October 6, 2005) (noting that the existing D.C. version of Rule 3.8 "does not resemble the ABA version"
and finding it unnecessary to make any substantive change in the D.C. rule). The D.C. Bar did move an
obligation that had been specific to prosecutors (not to exercise peremptory strikes based on invidious
discrimination) to a general duty applicable to all lawyers. Id.
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ments in its own version of Model Rule 3.8, the Ethics 2000 process has served
both to (1) increase uniformity across the states as a whole and (2) spark
innovation in State prosecutorial ethics rules in certain leadership states. Both
effects (which are, of course, to a certain degree in tension) are explored below.
A. ETHICS 2000'S EFFECT IN INCREASING STATE CONFORMITY WITH ABA
RULE 3.8
The arduous process of amending the ABA's ethics rules is, of course, only the
first step toward reform. The ethical duties framed by the ABA are after all simply
"model" rules. As critical, if not more critical, is the adoption of the ABA's rules
by the states as enforceable ethics rules, subject to disciplinary sanctions.
The Ethics 2000 process has been remarkably successful in persuading state
bar authorities across the country to revisit and reconsider their entire bodies of
ethics rules. As noted, every state and the District of Columbia undertook some
review in the wake of Ethics 200076 - a process that has so far been completed by
about two-thirds of the States.7 7 The rest of the states are still in the process of
reviewing their ethics rules.78 The- Ethics 2000 project has also succeeded in
prompting the few hold-out States that still had ethics rules based on the ABA's
Model Code (superceded by the ABA in 1983) 7 9 to move toward Model
Rules-based systems.8°
In this process, the post-Ethics 2000 experience has shown that, to date, most
states have been willing to follow the ABA's leadership in the area of
prosecutorial ethics. The majority of states that have completed their Ethics 2000
review have looked to the ABA for guidance on prosecutorial ethics, and have often not
been inclined to second-guess the nuances of the particular language in Rule 3.8..
76. See Susan M. Campbell, State Committees Review and Respond to Model Rules Amendments, 15 No. 1
PROF. LAW. 14 (2004) (as updated November 30, 2007) (reporting that as of 2007, forty-nine States and the
District of Columbia reported that they had committees reviewing their professional conduct rules in light of the
ABA's changes in the Ethics 2000 process). Alabama subsequently adopted changes to its ethics rules in light of
Ethics 2000 without appointing a committee. See Supreme Court of Alabama, Order (June 23, 2008).
77. See supra note 8 (cite to ABA website tracking State implementation of Ethics 2000).
78. Id.
79. As of December 1999, a total of nine states had not yet adopted a Model Rules-based system. Eight of
these states still based their system of legal ethics rules on the Model Code (Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee), while California had a sui generis system based neither on the Model
Code or the Model Rules. (Two other states had only just become Model Rules jurisdictions: Vermont, which
converted to a Model Rules-based system effective September of 1999; and Virginia, which had announced its
intent to convert to a Model Rules-based system effective January of 2000.).
80. Since the conclusion of Ethics 2000, six of the hold-out states have converted from Model Code to Model
Rules jurisdictions (Iowa, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee). In addition, Georgia converted
to a Model Rules jurisdiction while the Ethics 2000 process was underway. The remaining hold-out states
(Maine and California) are all presently considering amendments that would transform their ethics systems to
Model Rules-based systems. The ABA maintains charts tracking both the dates of adoption of the ABA's Model
Rules, see http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/chron-states.html, and the States' response to Ethics 2000, supra
note 8.
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHics [Vol. 22:427
1. TtE PATCHWORK OF STATE PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS RULES AS OF 1999
Going into the Ethics 2000 process, the picture of state prosecutorial ethics
rules looked much like the field of legal ethics generally: A "patchwork pattern of
state regulation" -that yielded prosecutorial ethics rules quite different across
jurisdictions t My Report paints a picture of the variety of state prosecutorial
ethics rules that existed as of 1999.
Every state had some ethics rules directed at the special duties of public
prosecutors. But some states had in place only the two limited (though important)
duties reflected in provisions of the outdated ABA Model Code. 2 Other states
had adopted Rule 3.8 as issued by the ABA in 1983, but had never updated their
rule to reflect the ABA's two subsequent amendments to the Rule (related to
lawyer subpoenas and pretrial publicity)8 3 Indeed, most states fell into this
category: Only eight states, as of 1999, had prosecutorial ethics rules that
reflected any of the changes made by the ABA over the preceding decade.8 4
Meanwhile, a number of states had adopted their own variations of Rule 3.8 or
had developed ethical rules with no counterpart in the ABA's prosecutorial ethics
rule.8
5
The District of Columbia, for example, had an active bar that developed ethical
81. See Ethics 2000, (explaining that the "patchwork pattern" of state ethics regulation was a key factor
motivating the ABA leaders to undertake Ethics 2000).
82. The ABA Model Code had provisions analogous to two of the six duties in the Model Rules (albeit
important ones): a bar on initiating criminal charges not supported by probable cause (DR 7-103(A)); and a duty
to make timely disclosure of exculpatory evidence (DR 7-103(B)). See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
REsPONSIBILrrY (1969). Similarly, California, whose system of legal ethics rules was sui generis, had a
prosecutorial ethics rule comparable to one of the Model Code provisions (on prosecuting criminal charges
without probable cause). See CAL. R. PROF. CoNDuCr R. 5-110 (1999).
83. As of 1999, the following thirty states had adopted prosecutorial ethics rules that were the same as or
closely modeled on the 1983 version of Model Rule 3.8, but had never revisited the State's version of the rule to
add either of the ABA's two post-1983 amendments: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. In addition, by 1999, Illinois had adopted'Rule 3.8,
though its version more closely resembled the even older provisions of the ABA Model Code. Thus, a total of
thirty-one states that could fairly be considered Model Rules jurisdictions in 1999 -all of which had some
variation of ABA Model Rule 3.8 - had never taken the initiative to adopt the ABA's post-1983 amendments to
the prosecutorial ethics rule.
84. The eight states whose prosecutorial ethics rules, as of 1999, reflected some or all of the ABA's post-1983
changes to Model Rule 3.8 (made by the ABA in 1990, 1994 and 1995) were: Alaska, Colorado, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Vermont. This figure, however, overstates the
influence of the ABA's amendments, since some of these states had more up-to-date ethics rules not because
they had diligently updated their ethics rules to reflect the ABA's amendments but because they had only
recently adopted the Model Rules. Rhode Island and Tennessee, meanwhile, both had lawyer subpoena
provisions in place in 1999, but had added those duties on their own initiative prior to the ABA's amendment to
its rule. See R.I. R. PROF'L. CoNDucr R. 3.8(f) (adopted in 1988); TENN. R. PROF'L. CONDucr R. 7-103(C)
(adopted in 1987).
85. See generally Appendix A at 12-37 (analyzing state variations of Rule 3.8); see also id. at 39-42
(analyzing state ethical duties of a prosecutor that do not appear in Rule 3.8).
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rules to govern not only the duties encompassed in the ABA rule but also such
important issues as the prosecutor's dealings with the grand jury,86 and invidious
discrimination in selecting prosecution targets.87 California, on the other hand,
included only one of the two basic ethical restrictions originally included in the
Model Code, the principle that prosecutors must have probable cause to
prosecute.88 In Alaska and Rhode Island, prosecutors could not ethically issue
subpoenas seeking testimony from lawyers about their clients without first
obtaining a court order approving the subpoena.89 But in the vast majority of
States, there were no ethical restrictions whatever on such investigative practices.
As these few examples suggest, going into Ethics 2000, the body of State
prosecutorial ethics rules was haphazard and failed to reflect a national consensus
on appropriate standards for prosecutorial conduct.90
2. THE EFFECT OF ETHIcs 2000 IN INCREASING UNIFORMITY IN STATE PROSECUTORIAL
ETmIcs RULES
One explanation for the relative stagnation in state ethics rules on prosecutorial
ethics could, of course, be that states did not support the particular provisions
adopted by the ABA in the 1990's - provisions restricting prosecutors from
issuing subpoenas to lawyers seeking client information9l and barring prosecu-
tors from making unnecessary public statements that "heighten public condemna-
tion" of the defendant.92 Subsequent developments, however, suggest that this
86. See D.C. R. PROF. CONDUCT R. 3.8(g) (1999) (providing that a prosecutor may not "intentionally interfere
with the independence of the grand jury, preempt a function of the grand jury, abuse the processes of the grand
jury, or fail to bring to the attention of the grand jury material facts tending substantially to negate the existence
of probable cause").
87. Id., Rule 3.8(a) (providing that in exercising the discretion to investigate or prosecute, a prosecutor shall
not "improperly favor or invidiously discriminate against any person").
88. See CA. R. PROF. CONDUCT R. 5-110 (1999) (providing that a member of the bar in government service
shall not prosecute criminal charges when the "member knows or should know that the charges are not
supported by probable cause").
89. See ALASKA R. PROF. CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (1999) (requiring that the prosecutor "obtain prior judicial
approval" to issue a criminal subpoena to a lawyer seeking client information); R.I. R. PROF. CONDUCT R. 3.8(f)
(to same effect).
90. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor at 153 (2007)
(noting that "there are few areas of legal practice more lacking in uniformity than the performance of
prosecutorial duties and responsibilities").
91. The ABA's ethical restriction on issuing criminal subpoenas to lawyers was adopted in February 1990.
This amendment brought Rule 3.8 into conformity with the ABA's earlier public resolution on the issuance of
subpoenas to lawyers, adopted in February of 1988. See ABA MIDYEAR MEETING, AM. BAR ASs'N, REPORT 118
(Feb. 1990). As originally adopted in 1990, ABA Model Rule 3.8(f) included a requirement of prior judicial
approval for a subpoena to a lawyer. That part of the rule was deleted by the ABA in August 1995. See AM. BAR
Ass'N, CENTER FOR PROF'L REsPONStatLITY, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2005, at 510-12 (2006). This 1995 deletion responded to litigation
challenging this part of the rule as outside of the authority of the ethical rules. Id. at 512.
92. The restriction on out-of-court statements by a prosecutor that tend to heighten public condemnation of
the accused was adopted in August 1994. See ABAANNUAL MEETING, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT 100 (Aug. 1994).
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was not the predominant reason. Following Ethics 2000, state ethics rules were
brought into much closer conformity with the ABA's prosecutorial ethics rule -
including the provisions on both lawyer subpoenas and pretrial publicity.
The Ethics 2000 process was surprisingly successful in prompting states to
move much closer to a model of national conformity with ABA ethical standards,
as expressed in Rule 3.8. Because many States had not considered the ABA's
interim amendments to Rule 3.8 (adopted in 1990, 1994, and 1995), or had not
adopted Rule 3.8 at all, the Ethics 2000 process significantly increased interstate
conformity in prosecutorial ethics, even without substantive change in the rule.93
The figures are quite striking, and suggest the influence of Ethics 2000 more
generally: Before Ethics 2000, as noted, almost two-thirds of the States followed
the old, outdated version of Rule 3.8 from 1983, but had never revisited the rule
despite the ABA's subsequent amendments. 94 In contrast, by July of 2008, the
numbers had completely reversed. Almost two-thirds of the States had put in
place up-to-date versions of Rule 3.8 identical to or closely based on the ABA's
prosecutorial ethics rule as issued by the Ethics 2000 Commission.95 These
figures, moreover, simply reflect changes adopted through July of 2008. The final
figures on interstate conformity in prosecutorial ethics rules in the wake of Ethics
2000 will likely be higher, since proposals to update prosecutorial ethics rules are
still pending in other States.96
The most significant trend in this regard is the dramatic increase in the number
of states that have adopted the ABA's restriction on criminal subpoenas issued to
lawyers - the most controversial aspect of the ABA model rule.9 7 Imposing
ethical restrictions on issuing subpoenas to defense counsel reflects valid
concerns about the increasing tendency of some prosecutors, particularly at the
93. The statistics that follow reflect states that have adopted the ABA's version of Model Rule 3.8 as it
emerged from the Ethics 2000 process in 2002. The very recent ABA amendments to Model Rule 3.8 (from
February of 2008) are not reflected in these figures, and have yet to work their way through the system.
94. See supra note 76 (noting that thirty-one States had a version of Model Rule 3.8 in 1999 but had not
updated that rule to reflect subsequent amendments).
95. By July of 2008, fourteen states had in place prosecutorial ethics rules that conformed exactly to the
Ethics 2000 version of Model Rule 3.8 (or with such minor differences as to be de minimis). These states
included: Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, and South Carolina. By the same date, seventeen other states had in place
prosecutorial ethics rules closely modeled on the Ethics 2000 version of Model Rule 3.8. These states included:
Arkansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Of the
remaining states that had completed their Ethics 2000 review and implemented rules changes by July of 2008,
only four states chose to leave in place versions of Rule 3.8 that depart substantially from the ABA's Ethics 2000
version of the rule (these states are Alabama, Connecticut, Florida and Mississippi). Most recently, in December
of 2008, New York similarly announced its intent to retain a version of Rule 3.8 limited to the two duties
encompassed in the old Model Code provision.
96. This year's amendments to ABA Model Rule 3.8, of course, threaten to reverse this trend.
97. In describing the lawyer subpoena rule as "controversial," the Article uses this term in the sense that this
ethical duty has been the subject of controversy, rather than to question the validity of the rule.
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federal level, to seek evidence directly from criminal defense counsel.98 Such
practices drive a wedge between clients and their lawyers, can compromise client
confidentiality, and threaten to create conflicts of interest. 99 Although the Justice
Department has an internal rule restricting such subpoenas, it has been adamantly
opposed to imposing such restrictions on prosecutors as an ethical matter.
Litigation initiated by Department to challenge the lawyer subpoena rule led the
ABA in 1995 to amend Model Rule 3.8 to tone down the restriction. 100
As this history suggests, as an ethical rule, this duty has been controversial.
The rule was largely absent from state ethics rules in 1999, when Ethics 2000
began. At that time, only ten states had adopted any ethical rule restricting lawyer
subpoenas,10 1 while most states had no ethical provision at all limiting such
investigative practices. Thus, Ethics 2000 had a significant impact in shaping
state ethics rules in the area of lawyer subpoenas, even though the ABA simply
preserved its rule intact. Indeed, perhaps the most important influence of Ethics
2000, in the area of prosecutorial ethics, was to induce many more states to adopt
a lawyer subpoena rule. The implementation process made clear that although
federal prosecutors were still actively working to eliminate the ethical rule
limiting lawyer subpoenas, their concerns were apparently not widely shared by
prosecutors and judges in the bar leadership on the state level.
Following Ethics 2000, sixteen new states adopted verbatim the ABA's lawyer
subpoena rule, 10 2 while three new states adopted rules closely modeled on the
ABA's lawyer subpoena rule. 10 3 At the same time, all ten states that had a lawyer
98. See, e.g., Whitehouse v. U.S. District Court, 53 F3d 1349, 1352 (lst Cir. 1995) ("Until recently, federal
prosecutors rarely subpoenaed attorneys to compel testimony relating to their clients. This practice changed in
the 1980s as the federal government stepped up its fight against organized crime and narcotics trafficking.").
99. See generally Fred Zacharias, A Critical Look at Rules Governing Grand Jury Subpoenas of Attorneys,
76 MINN. L. REV. 917, 921-24 (1992) (discussing issues raised when prosecutors subpoena lawyers to give
testimony about their clients, including problems of trust, loyalty, confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and
prosecutorial abuse).
100. See generally AM. BAR. ASS'N, supra note 84, at 509-12 (describing the history of the ABA's lawyer
subpoena rule, including federal prosecutors' legal challenges to the rule). The ABA's 1995 amendment
eliminated a provision in the original rule that had also barred a prosecutor from issuing a subpoena to a lawyer
unless "the prosecutor obtains prior judicial approval after an opportunity for an adversarial proceeding." Id. at
511.
101. These states were: Alaska, Colorado, Louisiana, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermont. See Appendix A at 29. A number of these states had adopted
their own variations of the model rule, rather than following the ABA's exact language.
102. Following Ethics 2000, the lawyer subpoena rule was renumbered Model Rule 3.8(e), but it remained
the same in substance. See ARz.. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr ER 3.8(e); DEL. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCr R.
3.8(e); GA. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(f); IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(e); IND. RULES OF
PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(e); IowA RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCTr R. 32:3.8(e); KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R.
Rule 226, Rule 3.8(e); Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(e); MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 3.8(e);
NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 3.8(e); NEV. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8(e); N.H. RULES OF PROF'L
CoNDuCr R. 3.8(e); N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 3.8(e); Oio RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCr R. 3.8(e);
WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 3.8(e); Wis. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. SCR 20:3.8(e).
103. See MwN. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(f) (adopting a variation of the ABA's Model Rule 3.8(e)
test that eliminates the requirement that the evidence be unavailable through other sources); N.J. RULES OF
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subpoena rule in 1999 retained some variation of the rule, including four states
that moved closer to the ABA's language following Ethics 2000. t°4 Thus, by July
of 2008, twenty-nine states had in place some rule modeled on the ABA's lawyer
subpoena rule.105 In North Carolina, in the wake of Ethics 2000, the State
expanded its lawyer subpoena rule to also cover search warrants directed at a
lawyer seeking client information, a logical extension of the ABA rule.
10 6
While the widespread adoption of the lawyer subpoena rule in the states might
be explained away on the ground that this practice is simply not a concern of state
prosecutors, 10 7 it is also telling, in this regard, that as part of their Ethics 2000
review many states also adopted the ABA's provision barring pretrial publicity
that tends to "heighten public condemnation" of the accused (a restriction that is,
if anything, more likely to come into play at the state level, where prosecutors
tend to be elected rather than appointed and are presumably more likely to make
public statements about pending cases). This aspect of the Model Rule imposes a
higher duty on prosecutors than on lawyers generally, who are ethically barred
from making public statements outside of court that threaten to "materially
prejudic[e] an adjudicative proceeding" in which the lawyer is participating. 108 A
prosecutor must also refrain from unnecessary out-of-court statements that tend
to increase the public opprobrium already attendant to becoming the target of a
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e) (adopting a variation of the ABA's Model Rule 3.8(e) test that makes steps one and
two alternative, rather than cumulative, requirements); S.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e) (adopting a
variation of the ABA's Model Rule 3.8(e) test that defines the coverage in terms of subpoenas that seek
information "relating to the lawyer's representation" of a client, rather than simply "evidence about" a client).
104. Following Ethics 2000, Louisiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Tennessee adopted the ABA's
version of Model Rule 3.8(e) in lieu of the State's prior rule. See LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e);
OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e); S.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e); TENN. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8(e). It should be noted that Tennessee's 2002 adoption of the lawyer subpoena rule came as part
of the State's conversion to the Model Rules, rather than its Ethics 2000 review (which is still open). As of July
2008, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Vermont continued to follow the ABA's 1995 version of Model Rule 3.8(e),
while Alaska continued to follow the 1990 version of the-ABA rule that included a judicial approval requirement
(it should be noted, however, that Alaska, Massachusetts, and Vermont have not completed their Ethics 2000
review). See ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f); COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e); MASS.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(0; VT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(0. North Carolina retained and
expanded the ethical duty concerning lawyer subpoenas. See N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e)
(covering subpoenas and search warrants). Rhode Island continues to follow its own sui generis lawyer
subpoena provision. See R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f).
105. Similar proposals have been made in other States. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
PROPOSED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT at 153 (February 1, 2008) (proposing that New York adopt an
ethical restriction on lawyers subpoenas closely modeled on the ABA's ethical duty); Memorandum from
Randall Difuntorum to Angela Chang, "FW:RRC - 5-110[3.8] - Post 6/13/08 Meeting Materials" (July 11,
2008) (attaching discussion draft of California Rule 3.8 that would add to the California ethics rules a lawyer
subpoena rule closely modeled on the ABA's ethical duty). The New York courts recently rejected this proposed
change without comment, while the California proposal is still pending. See infra note 138.
106. See N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e).
107. It may be that State prosecutors did not oppose adding this requirement. At the State level, prosecutors
are less likely to issue subpoenas to defense lawyers because of the different nature of their case load, which
tends to be focused on street crime rather than white collar crime.
108. MODEL RULES R. 3.6(a).
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criminal charge.10 9 Here, too, the opposition of federal prosecutors to this ethical
rule apparently did not significantly deter implementation on the state level.
As of 1999, only three states had adopted the ABA's ethical bar on unnecessary
public statements that serve to heighten public condemnation of a defendant.1" 0
Following Ethics 2000, twenty-three additional states have so far adopted this
duty verbatim as part of their state prosecutorial ethics rule.1 11 This number will
likely rise as more states complete Ethics 2000 reviews. These data too clearly
suggest that Ethics 2000 had a cognizable influence in prompting states to move
toward more standardized ethics rules - even though the ABA did not reform or
improve upon that standard. Ironically, the states were successfully induced to
move closer together in their prosecutorial ethics standards, even though this
success arguably simply perpetuated the inadequacy of the system.
National uniformity in legal ethics is not, of course, an absolute goal. Still,
differences in ethical standards between states should ideally be based on
conscious decisions, whether based on differences in local practice or on
considered disagreements with the ABA's approach, rather than lack of attention
to updating a jurisdiction's ethical standards.1 12 In the words of one scholar,
while complete uniformity in prosecutorial ethics is neither possible nor
desirable, "vast disparities in how prosecutors perform fundamental duties and
109. See MODEL RULES R. 3.8(f) cmt. 6.
110. These states were Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Oklahoma. The District of Columbia also
followed a variation of the rule. See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCr R. 3.8(0 (1999) (adopting an ethical bar on
extrajudicial comments by a prosecutor that "serve to heighten condemnation of the accused" and do not serve a
legitimate law enforcement purpose).
111. As of July 2008, twenty-three additional states had adopted verbatim the portion of Model Rule 3.8(f)
that established the prosecutor's duty concerning unnecessary condemnatory public statements. See AiZ.
RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr ER 3.8(); ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8(e); COLO. RULES OF PROF'L
CoNDucr R. 3.8(f); DEL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 3.8(0; IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8(f); IND.
RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 3.8(); IOWA RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 32:3.8(f); KAN. RULES OF PROF'L
CoNDucr 226, Rule 3.8(f); LA. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(f); MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8(e);
Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(); MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(f); NEB. RULES OF PROF'L
CoNDUCT R. 3.8(f); NEV. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(f); N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 3.8(f); N.D.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCr R. 3.8(e); R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr
R. 3.8(e); S.C. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUcr R. 3.8(f); S.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f); WA. RULES OF
PROF'L CoNDUCT R. 3.8(f); Wyo. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(e); see also N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr
R. 3.8(f) (preserving the duty); OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUcr R. 3.8(f) (same); MASS. RULES OF PROF'L
CoNDucr R. 3.8(g) (same). In addition, by 2008, Illinois had adopted a variation of the ABA provision as well,
though not as part of its Ethics 2000 review (which is still open). See ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 3.8(e)
(2008) (barring unnecessary public statements that "pose a serious and imminent threat of heightening public
condemnation of the accused"). This brings to twenty-six the total number of states with such a provision as of
July 2008.
112. In Illinois, for example, after noting that many lawyers practice in more than one state, that legal
transactions are often interstate in nature, and that clients and lawyers will benefit from using consistent ethics
terminology, the Committee reviewing the Illinois ethics rules urged that the ABA Model Rules be adopted
absent a "compelling reason" for rejecting a particular provision. See ISBA/CBA [Illinois State Bar
Association/Chicago Bar Association] Joint Committee on Ethics 2000, Revised Final Report at 6 (Jan. 8, 2004,
as revised April 1, 2004); see also id. at 8 ("The value of national unifonnity and consistency in ethics rules is
clear. The practice of law is no longer a purely local matter.").
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responsibilities suggest a need for guidance."' 13 In this sense, Ethics 2000 was
successful in its goal of increasing uniformity, even if the process proved
disappointing in the degree to which the prosecutorial ethics rules so imple-
mented remained incomplete.
Some conclusions can be drawn from this information. The fact that most
states have proved willing to closely follow Model Rule 3.8 in the wake of Ethics
2000 (including its lawyer subpoena rule) suggests that the earlier lack of
conformity in state prosecutorial ethics rules was more likely a function of
inattention to updating state ethics rules than disagreement with the ABA's
approach. While this bodes well for the ABA's leadership in ethics - including in
the sometimes sensitive area of prosecutorial ethics - it also suggests that
proceeding by way of a series of piece-meal amendments to the Rules is likely to
lead to the very problems with inconsistency that led the ABA to initiate Ethics
2000. For whatever reason, it clearly is not easy to induce state bars to undertake
the rules amendment process on a rolling basis. 114 This suggests that in terms of
maximizing the likelihood of state implementation of reforms, appointing a Task
Force to review Model Rule 3.8 as a whole is preferable to a series of individual
amendments to portions of the rule.
Beyond this, the lessons to be drawn from these figures are ambiguous. With
twenty-twenty hindsight, it is possible, as some commentators have implied, that
the ABA missed a significant opportunity in Ethics 2000 to make meaningful
changes to Rule 3.8, and that the states would have been willing to follow suit. 115
On the other hand, within a few short years, the political climate has become so
much more receptive to the problem of prosecutorial misconduct that it is hard to
recall how poor the prospects seemed for reforming the prosecutorial ethics rules
in 1999.116 It may be that a more ambitious Ethics 2000 review would have
backfired, for precisely the same reasons that the ABA exercised forbearance.
117
113. Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor at 153 (2007).
114. This evidence of state inertia points to one clear conclusion: Given the hurdles to opening the state
amendment process, it is critical to take advantage of the open, but narrow, window in the states still considering
their rules in light of Ethics 2000 to add the new ABA duty on wrongful convictions to the mix (new Model
Rules 3.8(g) and (h)).
115. See Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor at 151 (2007)
(suggesting that the Ethics 2000 process was a "lost opportunity").
116. See, e.g., Green, Prosecutorial Ethics As Usual, supra note 9, at 1575 (noting that the Ethics 2000
Commission "had good reason to conclude that strengthening the [prosecutorial ethics] rule would be an
unprofitable expenditure of time, energy, and good will because the Commission's personnel and process made
it unlikely that prosecutors and defense counsel would accept its proposed additions, and because the inevitable
firestorm would potentially eclipse its other work").
117. The degree to which the states are willing to reopen or expand their rules amendment process to add
new ABA Model Rules (g) and (h) (concerning wrongful convictions) will be a telling sign of whether the
climate for reform of the prosecutorial ethics rules has meaningfully changed.
[Vol. 22:427
THE STATE OF RULE 3.8
B. ETHICS 2000'S EFFECT IN INSPIRING STATE-SPECIFIC REFORMS OF
RULE 3.8
The other notable effect of Ethics 2000 - and an even more intriguing
development - has been thoughtful innovations the process it has sparked in
certain leadership states. In the wake of Ethics 2000, bar leaders in states like
Wisconsin, New York, and North Carolina have shown the political will not
simply to adopt the ABA Model Rules, where appropriate, but also to supplement,
clarify and strengthen Rule 3.8 with new ethical duties and refinements. State
prosecutors may well be more amenable to participation in constructive ethics
reform than the Justice Department's highly public opposition might suggest.
Some of the more notable recent state-led innovations in prosecutorial ethics
are described briefly below, organized by topic area.
1. A PROSECUTOR'S ETHIcAL DuTiEs IN NEGOTIATING GuiLTY PLEAS
The prosecutor's special ethical responsibility in connection with negotiating
guilty pleas is, as noted at the outset of this Article, one of the main omissions
from the ABA Model Rule 3.8.I ' In negotiating plea agreements with criminal
defendants, it is generally understood that a prosecutor does not stand on the
same ethical footing as a lawyer for an ordinary party, who is subject to very
limited ethical duties (essentially, the duty not to make deliberate misrepresenta-
tions). 1 9 A prosecutor has some greater ethical obligations in terms of the
conduct and candor we expect. Yet the specific duties the prosecutor has in plea
negotiations are not spelled out in the rule.
As part of its Ethics 2000 review, Wisconsin adopted a thoughtful supplemen-
tal ethics provision that sheds light on one aspect of the prosecutor's ethical
duties in plea negotiations - the problem of reaching plea agreements with
unrepresented defendants. The state's provision was apparently inspired by its
incisive review of ABA Model Rule 3.8(c), one of the most confusing provisions
in the ABA rule, which concerns a prosecutor's duty not to seek waivers of
important pretrial rights from an accused who is not represented.1
21
Strictly read, the black letter rule seems to prohibit prosecutors from dealing
directly with pro se defendants' 2 1 - a conclusion that would pose a significant
118. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor at 149 (2007)
(noting that the prosecutor who withholds exculpatory information from the defendant while negotiating a plea
to the offense "arguably is engaging in unethical conduct").
119. See MODEL RuLEs R. 4.1(a) (providing that in the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
"knowingly... make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person").
120. See MODEL RULEs R. 3.8(c) (providing that a prosecutor shall "not seek to obtain from an unrepresented
accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing").
121. See, e.g., Ben Kempinen, An Unrepresented Person, WIscoNsIN LAWYER, Vol. 78, No. 10 (October
2005) (observing that "if the rule is read to prohibit seeking waivers of any procedural right - however important
- the rule appears to flatly prohibit plea negotiations with unrepresented defendants. By definition, seeking a
20091
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problem for prosecutors dealing with misdemeanor cases - though the commen-
tary disavows any such intent.122 More broadly, Model Rule 3.8(c) fails to
comprehensively address the role a prosecutor may ethically play in dealing with
unrepresented defendants. This presents not only the narrow question of waiving
preliminary hearings, but the much broader problem of negotiating case
resolutions with defendants who lack counsel (including those who have waived
rights to counsel or cannot afford to retain a lawyer).
In place of ABA Model Rule 3.8(c), and to supplement that rule, Wisconsin
drafted a thoughtful and comprehensive rule on the general question of the ethical
limits of a prosecutor's conduct when negotiating with unrepresented persons.
Under the Wisconsin rule, a prosecutor may discuss a matter with an unrepre-
sented defendant, provide information about settlement, and negotiate a resolu-
tion that may include a waiver of constitutional and statutory rights, but the
prosecutor may not provide "legal advice" to the person or assist the person in the
completion of court forms such as guilty plea forms. 12 3 Wisconsin also added an
ethical rule expressly providing that a prosecutor, whether during an investiga-
tion or a court proceeding, must inform an unrepresented person of the
prosecutor's role and interest in the matter.' 24
By taking on an important and nuanced issue not addressed in Model Rule 3.8,
the Wisconsin bar authorities used the Ethics 2000 review process to read the
model rule carefully and improve upon it. The Wisconsin amendment is a
positive contribution to prosecutorial ethics and serves as an excellent example of
the value of ground-up reform. Many additional ethical questions about plea
bargaining remain. 1
25
2. A PROSECUTOR'S ETHICAL DuTY IN INVESTIGATING CRIMES
In the same period that the ABA's Ethics 2000 review was ongoing,
Massachusetts adopted an important ethical rule that belongs in this list because it
addresses another critical area missing from ABA Model Rule 3.8: The
prosecutor's duty in investigating crime. In particular, the Massachusetts rule
guilty plea is seeking to obtain waivers of important rights. Consequently, an unstrained reading of [Rule 3.8(c)]
suggests that any plea negotiation with an unrepresented party is unethical, however fairly conducted")..
122. See MODEL RuLEs R. 3.8 cmt. 2 (noting that the bar on seeking waivers of important pretrial rights
"does not apply.., to an accused appearing pro se with the approval of the tribunal").
123. See WIs. R. PROF. CoNDucr SCR 20:3.8(d).
124. Id., SCR 20:3.8(c).
125. See, e.g., NDAA, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, § 43.4 (2d ed. 1991) (a prosecutor "should not
attempt to utilize the charging decision only as a leverage device in obtaining guilty pleas to lesser charges");
id., §43.5 (a prosecutor "should not file charges for the purpose of obtaining from a defendant a release of
potential civil claims" against the prosecutor, police or others); cf ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
PROSECUTION FuNc-rION STANDAoS, Standard 3-3.9(g) (3d ed. 1993) (a prosecutor "should not condition a
dismissal of charges, nolle prosequi, or similar action on the accused's relinquishment of the right to seek civil
redress" absent court approval).
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expresses the important principle that a prosecutor should not "intentionally
avoid pursuit of evidence because the prosecutor believes it will damage the
prosecution's case or aid the accused." 126 This key principle was reflected in the
ethical considerations that formed part of the Model Code,1 27 but was not
included in the ABA's Model Rule.
This duty reflects an important concrete expression of the prosecutor's duty not
simply to seek convictions but to seek justice. The prosecutor's duty in
investigating crime goes beyond that of an ordinary advocate. As a general
matter, a lawyer is not ethically required to uncover evidence to help the
opposing party, merely to refrain from unlawfully obstructing the other side's
access to evidence or unlawfully destroying evidence. 128 She has no obligation to
follow investigative leads that will generate evidence to help her trial adversary.
The prosecutor's role is quite different. Her obligation to investigate fairly and
impartially is an important aspect of a prosecutor's role-specific ethics.
In generating this ground-up improvement to the prosecutorial ethics rules,
Massachusetts insightfully concluded that it is important to spell out this
principle in the black-letter of Rule 3.8 (particularly given the evident relation-
ship between this duty and the prosecutor's central duty to produce exculpatory
evidence). Undoubtedly, there are other important ethical limitations on the
prosecutor's investigative conduct that are likewise missing from the ABA Model
Rule, and would benefit from similar study.
129
3. A PROSECUTOR's ETHICAL DUTiES wrrH RESPECT TO EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
The post-Ethics 2000 period also generated a notable state-initiated improve-
ment to one of the most established aspects of Model Rule 3.8 - the duty to
provide exculpatory evidence under Rule 3.8(d) - through a similarly thoughtful
state review process. One problem with the ABA rule is that although it requires a
prosecutor to produce to the defendant any evidence or information that tends to
negate guilt, by its terms, the rule limits the ethical duty toinformation "known"
to the prosecutor. 130 Exculpatory evidence existing in the case file may not be
personally known to the individual prosecutor responsible for handling the case
at trial. Yet the rule fails to expressly require the prosecutor to make a diligent
126. See MA. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.80); see also D.C. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 3.8(d) (to
same effect).
127. See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILrY, EC 7-13 (1969) (providing that "a prosecutor should
not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence merely because he believes it will damage the prosecutor's case or
aid the accused").
128. See MODEL RULEs R. 3.4(a).
129. See, e.g., D.C. RULEs OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 3.8(a) (providing that in exercising discretion to
investigate or prosecute, a prosecutor shall not "improperly favor or invidiously discriminate against any
person"); id., R. 3.8(g) (laying out the ethical principles that govern a prosecutor's relationship with the grand
jury).
130. MODEL RuLEs R. 3.8(d) (2008).
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search for such material in the hands of the prosecution and the police.13'
In the wake of the state's recent experience with some notorious cases of
prosecutorial misconduct, North Carolina concluded that the ABA's current rule
does not sufficiently express the prosecutor's ethical obligations with respect to
exculpatory evidence. 1 32 The state chose to rethink and substantively improve its
version of Model Rule 3.8(d) by requiring not simply disclosure of known
exculpatory evidence but also a "reasonably diligent inquiry" by the prosecutor
to locate such evidence. 1
33
This addition to Rule 3.8 by North Carolina, too, reflects a beneficial,
ground-up state reform that promises to improve the prosecutorial ethics rules.
The same process could fruitfully be brought to other key questions that remain
unanswered in Rule 3.8(d) - such as the critical question what it means to
"timely" disclose exculpatory information in connection with plea negotia-
tions 13
4
4. A PROSECUTOR'S ETHICAL DUTY IN EXERCISING CHARGING DISCRETION
Finally, another important state reform effort took on an issue highlighted in
my 1999 Report - the degree of evidence that should ethically be required to file
and pursue criminal charges.135 Though the Ethics 2000 Commission was not
convinced to change the ABA's rule, the state review process that followed in its
wake convinced an important body of bar leaders that the ABA's "probable
cause" standard for prosecuting criminal offenses, embodied in Model Rule
3.8(a), sets too low an ethical floor. 136 While these New York bar leaders were
131. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor at 150 (2007)
(noting that Model Rule 3.8(d), concerning exculpatory evidence, "does not require prosecutors to make efforts
to discover such information from anyone").
132. See Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong:
The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEo. MASON. L. REv. 257, 271-72 (2008) (noting that
the North Carolina State Bar amended Rule 3.8(d) to add a duty to make "reasonably diligent inquiry" seeking
exculpatory evidence in the wake of a notorious case involving prosecutorial misconduct in the murder
prosecution of Alan Gell).
133. Id. At the same time it made this amendment, North Carolina expanded the scope of its version of Rule
3.8 to create an ethical duty to timely disclose to the defense "all evidence or information required to be
disclosed by applicable law, rules of procedure, or court opinions." Compare MODEL RULES R. 3.4(c) and (d)
(noting the general obligation of every lawyer, in adversary proceedings, not to "knowingly disobey an
obligation under the rules of a tribunal" and to "make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a lawful
discovery request by an opposing party").
134. See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosing Exculpatory Material in Plea Negotiations, 16
CRIM. JUST. 41, 42- (Fall 2001) ("The ethics rule makes no specific mention of plea negotiations or guilty pleas.
The language of the rule, especially its requirement of 'timely disclosure,' certainly mandates that prosecutors
disclose exculpatory material during plea negotiations if not sooner. Yet, secondary sources, such as treatises, do
not typically discuss the rule in the context of plea negotiations, and we can find no authority that applies the
rule in that context.").
135. See Appendix A at 15 (noting that probable cause "is a very minimal requirement").
136. See Nsw YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, PROPOSED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr at 153 (February
1, 2008); compare D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(c) (providing that a prosecutor shall not "prosecute to
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ultimately not successful in convincing the New York courts to change that
State's ethics rule, the New York bar's consensus on the importance of clarifying
the charging standard is a notable development. 1
37
As adopted by the ABA, Model Rule 3.8(a) builds an important ethical
principle - the minimum ethical threshold for a prosecutor to charge a defendant
criminally - around the concept of "probable cause." This legal concept,
frequently used in constitutional law 138 is generally understood to mean a
relatively limited and informal requirement of evidentiary proof, well below the
proof required to support conviction at trial. 139 Other bodies of standards reflect
the conclusion that the probable cause rule fails to express the appropriate ethical
standard.
The ABA's Criminal Justice Standards, for example, set a higher bar than
probable cause, providing that a prosecutor should not initiate, cause to be
initiated, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges "in the absence of
sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction.' ' 140 This standard, the
commentary emphasizes, is substantially higher than probable cause. 141 The
United States Attorneys Manual, similarly, views probable cause as a minimal
requirement that is simply a "threshold consideration," the absence of which
absolutely bars prosecution. 142 Federal prosecutors are cautioned that to initiate
prosecution, the prosecutor should be convinced not simply that probable cause
exists but that the "admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and
sustain a conviction."'143 State prosecutors, similarly, are guided by a standard
trial a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie
showing of guilt").
137. The New York courts recently chose, without comment, to retain the language of the State's prior
version of Rule 3.8, simply changing the numbering of the rule. See www.nycourts.gov/press/pr2008_7.shtml
(press release and link to revised New York ethics rules). The court system did not explain why it chose to make
no substantive changes in the prosecutorial ethics rule, as the bar leadership had recommended.
138. Probable cause is the constitutional standard under the Fourth Amendment for obtaining a search
warrant and for detaining a defendant prior to trial. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV .The same standard is applied by
the federal courts at a preliminary hearing to decide whether to allow charges to proceed to trial. See FED. R.
CuM. P. 5.1(a).
139. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (noting that the substance of the varied
definitions of probable cause as articulated by the Supreme Court is simply "a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt"). Probable cause is understood to be somewhere above "bare suspicion" but below the evidence that
would justify conviction. Id.; see also, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1975) (noting that probable
cause is a "practical, nontechnical" conception); Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(emphasizing the "broad" gap between the concepts of probable cause and proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
140. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROsECUTION FUNCION AND DEFENSE FUNCrION STANDARDS,
Standard 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993).
141. See id., Commentary at 73 (noting that a probable cause standard is "substantially less than sufficient
admissible evidence to sustain a conviction").
142. UNITED STATES ATroRNEYs' MANuAL, Section 9-27.200 (B).
143. Id., Section 9-27.220(A); see also id at 9-27.220(B) (emphasizing that in addition to the existence of
admissible evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction, "no prosecution should be initiated unless the
government believes that the person probably will be found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact").
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issued by the National District Attorneys Association that a prosecutor should file
"only those charges which he reasonably believes can be substantiated by
admissible evidence at trial." 144
These standards suggest a consensus view about the ethics of criminal
charging that is not reflected in current Model Rule 3.8. Had it been accepted, for
example, the proposal in New York would have allowed the filing of criminal
charges based on probable cause but made it unethical to prosecute at trial
criminal charges not supported by "evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie
showing of guilt. ' 145 This pair of standards is incorporated in the District of
Columbia ethical rules. 1 46 This example provides yet more evidence that
leadership states are beginning to engage in thoughtful reform efforts directed at
the prosecutorial ethics rules, reforms which may in turn influence other states
and national bar authorities.
While each of the amendments discussed above reflects a valuable reform, a
final innovation arising out of the Ethics 2000 implementation process deserves
separate consideration: The proposal of the New York State bar to add a provision
spelling out the prosecutor's ethical duty to help rectify wrongful convictions of
innocent defendants. It was this inspired and ambitious reform - which originated
in an idea generated by New York City's local bar association - that ultimately
led to the ABA's recent successful action to amend Model Rule 3.8. This reflects
the paradigmatic "ground-up" innovation in prosecutorial ethics, and suggests a
new model for rules reform discussed below. 147
III. A NEW MODEL OF RULES REFORM: ADDING THE PROSECUTOR'S
ETHICAL DUTY TO RECTIFY WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
In February of 2008, when the ABA adopted black-letter rules that elucidate
the prosecutor's ethical duties when faced with evidence that a defendant was
wrongly convicted, this effort arose directly out of the New York Bar
Association's thoughtful review of its own ethics rules in the wake of Ethics 2000
144. NDAA, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 43.3 (2d ed. 1991X).
145. The New York proposal would provide that a prosecutor shall not; (1) institute or maintain a charge
when the prosecutor knows or it is obvious that the charge is not supported by probable cause; or (2) prosecute a
charge at trial when the prosecutor knows or it is obvious that the charge cannot be supported by evidence
sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of guilt. See NEw YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, PROPOSED RuLEs
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT at 153 (February 1, 2008).
146. See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b) (making it unethical to file in court or maintain a charge
the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause); id. R. 3.8(c) (making it unethical to prosecute to trial
a charge the prosecutor knows is not supported by evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of
guilt).
147. Ironically, as noted above, the New York courts recently issued a new rule, effective April of 2009,
which simply repeats (and renumbers) the prosecutor's ethical duties expressed in the old version of New York's
ethics rules. The new version of New York Rule 3.8 does not include the prosecutor's duty. with respect to
wrongful convictions, nor does it reflect any of the ethical duties added to the Model Rules by the ABA since
1969. See supra note 137.
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- and the initiative taken by bar leaders and academics to expand these reforms to
the national level. This amendment is notable, not only because it reflects the first
step taken by the ABA in many years to add a meaningful, timely, and useful duty
to Rule 3.8, but also because it suggests a new model of rules reform. While the
New York courts chose not to undertake any substantive reform of its version of
the prosecutorial ethics rule, the New York State Bar's proposal proved
influential on a national level.
As noted, this was a ground-up reform that began at the state and local level
and influenced the ABA - the opposite course from the top-down process of
general ethics reform.148 Within the ABA, as well, the new rule took a notably
different course than niost ethics rules. The change was proposed by the Criminal
Justice Section, rather than the ABA's dedicated ethics committee, reflecting a
new and positive approach to amending prosecutorial ethics. By allowing the
proposal to percolate through the ranks of the criminal justice system, it gave
supporters time to build consensus, refine the rules based on a breadth of
experience among state and federal prosecutors, defense counsel and judges, and
develop a solid ground of support for the proposed change.
Both the substance and process of this amendment - a striking departure from
the Ethics 2000 experience - are worth exploring.
A. ADDING A NEW DUTY TO REMEDY WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
The new duties recently added to ABA Model Rule 3.8 concern the
prosecutor's duty when faced with evidence that a criminal defendant has been
wrongfully convicted.' 49 To the extent evidence suggesting a defendant's lack of
guilt surfaces during a case, this circumstance was addressed by the existing rule:
A prosecutor has an ethical duty, under Rule 3.8(d), to "timely" disclose to the
defense evidence and information that "tends to negate the guilt" of the
defendant. 150 The problem not addressed, until the recent amendment, was the
prosecutor's ethical duty when she discovers exculpatory evidence after a
defendant's conviction - whether the evidence concerns a case prosecuted by the
prosecutor herself, by someone in her office, or by a prosecutor in another
jurisdiction. 151
148. Proposed changes to the ABA's model ethics rules are generally within the ambit of the ABA's Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, which is the body within the ABA tasked with
responsibility to develop model national ethics standards. See http://www.abanet.orglcpr/committeesl
scepr.html.
149. See AMEPicAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SETON, Report 105B to the House of Delegates
(February 2008) (proposing a resolution, approved by the ABA in February of 2008, to adopt as amendments
Model Rule 3.8(g) and (h), addressing a prosecutor's ethical duties when faced with evidence that either
suggests or establishes that a convicted defendant did not commit the crime charged).
150. See MODEL RULES R. 3.8(d).
151. To the extent this ethical dilemma fell within the general rubric of a lawyer's duties when she comes to
learn that she has presented false evidence to a tribunal, this duty by its terms continues only to the "conclusion
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The Supreme Court had suggested that it is a prosecutor's ethical duty "to
inform the appropriate authority of after-acquired or other information that casts
doubt upon the correctness of the conviction." 152 However, this duty was not
embodied in the ethics rules. The ethical obligation to "timely" disclose
exculpatory evidence failed to clearly address the matter. (Indeed, the prosecu-
tor's duty to "timely" disclose exculpatory evidence is ambiguous more
generally). Nor did commentary to Rule 3.8(d) address the situation in which a
prosecutor later acquires evidence suggesting a convicted defendant's innocence.
At the same time, contemporaneous news coverage highlighted for the bar
leadership the very real problem of wrongful convictions of innocent defendants.
A host of recent cases initiated by Innocence Projects involving exonerations
based on DNA evidence demonstrated the fallibility of the system, and the very
real possibility that innocent defendants had been Wrongfully convicted. 153
Several influential newspaper exposes, based on studies of thousands of criminal
cases, similarly highlighted the problem of prosecutorial misconduct, including a
number of cases in which innocent defendants were later found to have been
wrongfully convicted.1 54 A comprehensive study by the Center for Public
Integrity in 2003 revealed, similarly, that prosecutorial misconduct was endemic,
and that the most common form of prosecutorial misconduct was the failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence. 155 These studies made clear that the problem of
wrongful convictions of innocent persons was very real, and highlighted the
of the proceeding." MODEL RuLEs R. 3.3(a), (c) and Comment [13] (noting that the rule sets a "practical time
limit on the obligation to rectify false evidence"). Moreover, this duty seems to contemplate simply a duty to
correct false evidence the lawyer herself has sponsored, and by its terms only concerns offering evidence before
a tribunal. See id. cmt. 1 ("This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the
proceedings of a tribunal.").
152. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976). In Imbler, the prosecutor had written to the
governor while the convicted defendant was on death row awaiting execution, disclosing additional evidence
discovered after trial. This evidence later formed the basis for a federal court's reversal of the defendant's
conviction on habeas based on prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 411-16. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found
the prosecutor immune from liability in civil damages, reasoning that permitting a damages claim in these
circumstances would discourage prosecutors from exercising their ethical duty to inform the appropriate
authorities following a conviction of evidence that casts doubt on a defendant's guilt. Id. at 427 n.25; see also,
e.g., Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362, 369 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that prosecutors' failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence discovered after the defendants' conviction but while their appeal was pending "raises
very serious questions" under the ethics rules).
153. See generally Barry Scheck, et al., Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution and Other Dispatches
From the Wrongly Convicted 246 (2000) (discussing numerous cases in which convicted defendants were
proved by DNA evidence to have been innocent). The efforts of Innocence Projects to reverse wrongful
convictions of innocent defendants are ongoing.
154. See generally Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 280 (2007) (describing two major newspaper studies by reporters at the Chicago Tribune
and the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, based on analysis of thousands of criminal cases, revealing numerous instances
of prosecutorial misconduct).
155. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor 123-41 (2007)
(summarizing study results, which revealed that courts took action to remedy convictions based on
prosecutorial misconduct in 2,000 of the 11,452 criminal cases studied by the Center for Public Integrity in
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responsibility of prosecutors, as "ministers of justice," to help remedy such
miscarriages of justice.1 56
The ABA responded by adopting amendments to Rule 3.8 to add two new
provisions concerning a prosecutor's ethical duties, depending on the strength of
the after-acquired evidence and the jurisdiction of conviction: The first provision
imposes disclosure and/or investigative duties when a prosecutor is faced with
"new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a
convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was
convicted;"'157 the second imposes a higher ethical duty to "seek to remedy" a
conviction when a prosecutor "knows of clear and convincing evidence
establishing" that a defendant prosecuted in her jurisdiction was convicted of an
offense the defendant did not commit.1 58 Extensive commentary explains and
elaborates upon these duties.' 59
The prosecutor's ethical duty to remedy wrongful convictions - the first
substantive change to the ABA's prosecutorial ethics rule in many years -
promises to become one of the most important provisions in the current rule.1
60
which claims of prosecutorial misconduct were raised). See generally Center for Public Integrity, http://www.
publicintegrity.org/default.aspx.
156. AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, Report 105B to the House of Delegates at 5 (February
2008) ("The provisions build upon the ABA's historic commitment to developing policies and standards
designed to give concrete meaning to the 'duty of prosecutors to seek justice, not merely to convict."').
157. See MODEL RULES R. 3.8(g) (added February 2008). This provision provides in full:
(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood
that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the
prosecutor shall:
(1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and
(2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction,
(A) promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and
(B) undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to
determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not
commit.
158. See MODEL RuLs R. 3.8(h) (added February 2008). This provision provides in full:
(h) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in the
prosecutor's jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the
prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.
159. See MODEL RULEs R. 3.8 cmt. 7-9. The ABA also amended the introductory commentary to Rule 3.8 to
make clear that the prosecutor's duty as a minister of justice includes the duty to see "that special precautions
are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons"). Id. cmt. 1 (amended February 2008).
160. See, e.g., AmE icAN BAR AssociATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTIoN, Report 105B to the House of
Delegates at 4 (February 2008) ("The obligation to avoid and rectify convictions of innocent people, to which
the proposed provisions give expression, is the most fundamental professional obligation of criminal
prosecutors.").
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B. CHANGING THE PROCESS OF PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS REFORM
Turning from the substance of this new ethical duty to the secret of the ABA's
success in achieving this reform, the process is notable in two respects: First,
these changes were proposed not by the Ethics Committee, the entity within the
ABA responsible for developing model ethics rules and issuing ethics opin-
ions, 16 1 but by the Criminal Justice Section, which represents lawyers and judges
working in criminal justice.
The Criminal Justice Section has been highly successful in developing an
influential body of Criminal Justice Standards that provide guidance in various
areas of criminal practice, such as the prosecution and defense function,
post-conviction relief, criminal discovery, sentencing, guilty pleas, and a wide
range of other criminal justice topics. 162 Through this process, the Section has
successfully brought together different segments of the criminal bar, including
judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and academics, in positive and constructive
discussions to agree on standards of conduct to govern criminal practice, in a
thoughtful setting outside the charged environment of particular criminal
litigation. In 2008, for example, the Section issued a brand new set of Standards,
addressing Prosecutorial Investigations. 
163
The break-through reflected in the recent Rule 3.8 amendments - the "aha"
moment - occurred when the leadership of the Section realized that it could use
the same collaborative process to seek reform of the ABA's prosecutorial ethics
rule. While the ABA's Criminal Justice Standards are often cited in court
decisions, they are not part of the ethics rules. As such, the standards of conduct
they propose are influential but are not enforceable. 164 Disciplinary proceedings
against individuals cannot be instituted for violating a standard of conduct set
forth in the Criminal Justice Standards. In proposing to add Model Rules 3.8(g)
and (h) to the ABA's ethics rules, the Section consciously decided to proceed by
seeking an amendment to the ethics rules rather than simply issuing a new
standard. 165 This represents an insightful new process, one which brings the
Section's success in generating consensus on the Criminal Justice Standards to
161. The full name of this body is the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility.
162. See generally http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/home.html (listing and providing tables of
contents for the different sets of ABA Criminal Justice Standards) In the interest of full disclosure, the author of
this Article previously served as the Chair of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards Committee, and was a reporter
for both the Discovery and Guilty Plea Standards. I am also currently one of many members of the Criminal
Justice Section's Ethics, Gideon and Professionalism Committee, the work of which is discussed infra.
163. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS ON PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS, Preamble
(February 2008) ("These Standards are intended as a guide to conduct for a prosecutor actively engaged in a
criminal investigation or performing a legally mandated investigative responsibility.").
164. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR AsSOcATION, CanMNAL JUSTICE SECTION, Report 105B to the House of
Delegates at 4 (February 2008) (noting the importance of including the prosecutor's duty concerning wrongful
convictions in the Model Rules, since the ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Justice "are not
intended to be enforced").
165. Id.
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the process of reforming the prosecutorial ethics rules.
The important difference - critical to Rule 3.8 in particular - is that unlike the
general membership of the Ethics 2000 Commission, or the ABA's Ethics
Committee, which is focused on lawyers' ethics, the Criminal Justice Section is a
dedicated group of lawyers who practice in criminal law and are committed to
improving the process of criminal justice in the United States. 166 By bringing this
prosecutorial ethics proposal up through the Criminal Justice Section's commit-
tee process, 167 it ensured that the details of the proposed amendment would be
thoroughly vetted by numerous prosecutorial and defense groups, both to refine
the rule and build support among diverse constituencies (including the prosecu-
tors who will be regulated by the new duty). 168 In another development critical to
the successful adoption of the Rule 3.8 amendments - in direct contrast to the
Ethics 2000 experience - the leadership of the Criminal Justice Section built on
its existing relationship with federal prosecutors to convince Department of
Justice representatives not to oppose the amendments they sought. 169
Second, another striking fact about the successful amendments to add Model
Rules 3.8(g) and (h) is that they found their roots in state and local reform
initiatives, rather than descending from above in a national initiative originated
by the ABA. The proposal originated in a thoughtful report issued by members of
the New York City bar association,"7 which was in turn adopted as part of the
Ethics 2000 review process within the New York State bar.171 This "ground-up"
reform process from within the criminal justice community reflected a positive
dialogue between State and national bar authorities that proved far more
successful than past efforts in amending the prosecutorial ethics rules. State and
local judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and academics have shown the will
166. In making its proposal, the Section also drew upon the Ethics Committee's advice, and the Ethics
Committee was a co-sponsor of the proposed amendments.
167. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Changes to Model Rules Impact Prosecutors, 23 CRIM. JUST. 1, 13 (Spring
2008) ("Both the black letter of the rule and the additions to the comments were the work of the Ethics, Gideon
and Professionalism Committee, cochaired by Bruce Green and Ellen Yaroshefsky.").
168. See id. at 4 (noting that the Criminal Justice Section "drew on the experience and expertise of
prosecutors, criminal defense lawyers and legal academics in its leadership" to refine the language of the rule).
169. Id. at 13 (noting that the Department of Justice considered asking the ABA House of Delegates to
postpone a vote on the proposed amendments to add Model Rules 3.8(g) and (h), but were convinced not to fight
the recommendation after long talks between Department representatives, ABA Criminal Justice Section Chair
Stephen Saltzburg, and Professor Bruce Green to explain the language of the rule). Professor Saltzburg has
noted that the "spirit of cooperation" reflected in these talks gave him hope "that the ABA and the DOJ might be
moving forward together in a joint effort to improve our criminal justice system." Id.
170. See id. at 13 (describing the origin of proposed Rules 3.8(g) and (h), which "had their genesis in a 2006
Report" issued by the New York City bar association); see also Proposed Prosecution Ethics Rules, The
Committee on Professional Responsibility, 61 The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
69 (2006).
171. See NEw YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, PROPOSED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr at 154 (February
1, 2008) (proposing to add to the New York ethics rules new Rules 3.8(h) and (g), concerning the prosecutor's
duty to help remedy wrongful convictions).
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and risen to the challenge of reforming prosecutorial ethics rules, where the
Ethics 2000 Commission could not.
In short, while the timing of these proposed changes - in the wake of scandals
over the conviction of innocent defendants - obviously created a powerful
impetus for reform, the process of reforming Rule 3.8 was also important to the
success of the recent prosecutorial ethics amendments at the ABA level. These
efforts are ongoing, and promise to bear further fruit in the near future.
IV. CONCLUSION
Clearly, the broad support needed to amend the prosecutorial ethics rule had
not sufficiently materialized in 1999 to lend the Ethics 2000 Commission the
confidence to undertake reform of Model Rule 3.8. But circumstances are now
different. Given the widespread publicity over some recent and notorious cases of
prosecutorial misconduct,' 72 there is now a window in which the public and the
legal community appear open to meaningful change. The public is more aware
than ever of the fallibility of prosecutors. Meaningful reform in the prosecutorial
ethics rule may finally be within reach, if ethics regulators can learn the lessons
from Ethics 2000 - that there is the political will among many leaders within the
criminal justice community to tackle the rules governing prosecutorial ethics, but
a patient, persistent, and inclusive process is critical.
172. See supra notes 1 to 3 (and accompanying text).
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INTRODUCTION
Rule 3.8 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter Model
Rules) Sets forth specific ethical restrictions which apply to a "prosecutor in a
criminal case." Like any lawyer, a prosecutor is subject to general ethical rules
such as Rule 3.3 on candor to the tribunal, Rule 3.4 on fairness to opposing party,
Rule 3.5 on trial decorum, and so on. In addition, Rule 3.8 contains a number of
restrictions that reflect the "special responsibilities" the prosecutor has because of
the unique role that he or she plays in the justice system as the representative of
the people in a criminal prosecution.
The need for special ethical rules governing the conduct of prosecutors is
based on the principle that it is the prosecution's role to represent a sovereign
whose goal is "not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."2 Most, if
not all, state jurisdictions have an ethics rule specific to the responsibilities of a
prosecutor. Many of these are modeled on ABA Rule 3.8. Some have adopted
Rule 3.8 with modifications, some notable examples of which are discussed
below. Others are based on the comparable provisions that were contained in the
ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility (hereinafter Model Code).
More generally, the subject of prosecutorial misconduct has received great
attention in academic writing over the last fifteen years. While some commenta-
tors have questioned whether specific obligations should be removed from (or
added to) Rule 3.8, the concept of ethical rules governing the conduct of
prosecutors in criminal cases is accepted as one of a number of important tools to
2. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2003)
("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.") (hereinafter
MODEL RuLEs); see generally Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors 'Seek Justice'?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
607 (1999) (emphasizing the special role and power of the prosecutor, and corresponding duty to "seek
justice").
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discourage and punish prosecutorial misconduct.3 Indeed, a principal criticism of
such ethics rules is not that they exist, but that they are too rarely applied in
practice to discipline prosecutors who have committed unethical conduct.
4
Two recent developments are likely to focus increased attention on Rule 3.8.
First, Congress recently adopted a statute making federal prosecutors subject to
the state ethical rules in the states where they practice (the "McDade Amend-
ment"). This has already focused the attention and considerable resources of the
Department of Justice on the development, amendment, and application of state
ethics rules governing prosecutors. Second, in recent years, Supreme Court
decisions and other developments have placed increasing restrictions on courts'
ability to use other sanctions to deter and punish prosecutorial misbehavior. This
puts more pressure on the use of ethics rules to bring prosecutors' behavior into
line with ethical expectations. While both of these developments principally
affect federal prosecutors, who are in the minority of prosecutors nationwide,
ethical rules affecting federal prosecutions have frequently become a significant
focus of the debate over ethical rules, both because of the prominence and
multi-state nature of federal prosecutions, and the voice of the Justice Depart-
ment as an advocate. Thus, it is likely that these developments will increase
attention to and reliance on Rule 3.8 (as well as the other ethical Rules applicable
to criminal prosecutions).,
This Report is divided into three parts. Part I explains the current context of
Rule 3.8. It briefly explains the history of the Rule, then details recent
developments which affect the Rule as a whole, including the recent passage of
the McDade Amendment, as. well as developments affecting application of
alternative sanctions. Part II analyzes the extent to which each of the seven
specific provisions of Rule 3.8 have been adopted by the states, describes
alternative versions some states have adopted, and details criticisms of each
provision (and recommendations concerning possible solutions thereto). Part III
discusses potential additions to Rule 3.8, including additional provisions adopted
by some states or contained in model codes or other bodies of standards.
Notably, while some commentators have suggested that ethical rules such as
Rule 3.8 be broadened to address a fuller range of prosecutorial misconduct, the
3. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976).
4. See, e.g., BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MiscoNDucr § 14.1 at i3-1 (West 1998) (the existing
sanctions are either too frequently employed or ineffective to punish or prevent misconduct" by prosecutors);
Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8
ST. THOMAS L. REv. 69,94 (1995) ("[C]ommentators have uniformly lamented the lack of effective discipline of
prosecutors who violate standards of professional conduct."); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against
Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693, 693 (1987) (disciplinary charges against
prosecutors have been "brought infrequently under the applicable rules" and "meaningful sanctions have been
applied only rarely").
5. See, e.g., Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors, 65 FoRDHAM L. REV.
355, 358 n. 8 (1996) (noting that federal prosecutors comprise a "group whose significance is perhaps belied by
their relatively small numbers").
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author is not aware of any formal proposal to this effect that has been put on the
table by any of.the major groups representing interests in the criminal justice
system. The Justice Department, which has in past years sought amendments to
Rule 3.8, has not submitted formal comments to the Commission seeking or
proposing any changes to this Rule. 6 Nor have any recent proposals been put
forward by the ABA's Criminal Justice Section, the ABA's Litigation Section, or
organized groups such as the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA),
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), and the
National Legal Aid and Defenders Association (NLADA).
Given the high degree of flux in this area caused by recent political and legal
developments, and the lack of formal proposals for change from those affected,
this Report suggests that the Commission should not lightly undertake significant
changes to Rule 3.8 at this time. While the Rule may benefit from an overall
review, such a review would be best undertaken over a period of time with
participation from the ground up from all of the groups involved. This will best
ensure acceptance among prosecutors, defense counsel and the courts of any
resulting amendments (and adoption in the states of any new Rules that may
result).
PART I: CONTEXT OF THE DEBATE OVER ETHICAL RESTRICTIONS
ON PROSECUTORS
A. HISTORY OF RULE 3.8
A version of ethical Rule 3.8 has been in existence, in some form, for many
years now. It was part of the ABA's original Model Code of Professional
Responsibility,7 and in 1983, when the Model Code was replaced by the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.8 was expanded. Over the years
since that time, several provisions have been added, and some amendments
made, but the Rule has remained largely intact. Now, as a result of a number of
developments, detailed below, Rule 3.8 has become the subject of increased
scrutiny in the criminal justice community, as well as of particular interest in
academic writings.
B. MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: THE MCDADE AMENDMENT
The congressional passage, in October of 1998, of the McDade Amendment
was a critical development related to Rule 3.8. This Amendment ended a
6. Thoughtful comments have been submitted by Department of Justice attorney Stephen J. Csontos, Senior
Legislative Counsel in the Tax Division, based on positions the Department has historically taken. However, Mr.
Csontos indicates that these comments have not been cleared at the higher levels of the Department, and do not
represent the official views of the Justice Department.
7. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSBLrrY DR 7-103 (1980) (hereinafter MODEL CODE).
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decade-long dispute between the Justice Department and ethics authorities over
the extent to which federal prosecutors are subject to state ethical rules and
disciplinary procedures. This Amendment resolves this question by providing
explicitly that federal prosecutors must follow "State laws and rules ... govern-
ing attorneys" in each state where such prosecutors practice. 8 However, the
McDade Amendment leaves open a number of questions as to how this principle
should be implemented, and promises to spark additional debates about the
content of specific state ethical rules such as Rule 3.8.
THE DECADE-LONG DEBATE: For the last ten years, the Justice Department has
taken the position that "state bar associations may not.., impose sanctions on a
government attorney who has acted within the scope of his federal responsibili-
ties." 9 The Department has also instituted a number of court cases seeking
declarations to this effect."° ABA and states ethics authorities (and a number of
courts) have taken the position, on the contrary, that the same standards of
professional conduct have governed, and should govern, federal prosecutors as
govern other lawyers."
THE "No-CONTACT" RULE: As the Commission is aware, this debate became
focused in recent years around the "no-contact" rule contained in ABA Model
Rule 4.2, which bars an attorney from communicating with a person known to be
represented by counsel without that counsel's consent. This rule has been widely
adopted in the States. The Department of Justice has taken the position that Rule
4.2 (and state rules modeled thereon) do not apply to federal prosecutors because
it would unduly interfere with their federal law enforcement function.
12
Consistent with this position, following the 1989 issuance of a memorandum
(the "Thornburgh Memorandum") espousing this position, in 1994 the Depart-
ment adopted regulations expressly exempting federal prosecutors from the
application of such state "no-contact" rules.1 3 These regulations, however, were
declared invalid in United States ex rel. O'Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., on
8. 28 U.S.C. § 530B.
9. 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 576, 577 (1980).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Colorado Supreme Court, 871 F. Supp. 1328 (D. Colo. 1994) at 1328 (suit by
U.S. Attorney seeking declaration that Colorado Rules 3.3(d) and 3.8(f) may not be applied to federal
prosecutors); Stem v. Supreme Judical Court for Mass., 184 F.R.D. 10, 11 (D. Me. 1999) (suit by U.S. Attorney
seeking declaration that Massachusetts Rule 3.8(f) may not be applied to federal prosecutors).
11. See, e.g., In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 488 (D.N.M. 1992) ("It is difficult to accept that today... federal
prosecutors can no longer function, as they have until now, if required to adhere to the same ethical standards as
other attorneys.").
12. See, e.g., United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (government argued that Supremacy
Clause precludes state authorities from taking disciplinary action against Department of Justice prosecutor
under state ethics rules modeled on Rule 4.2); In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. at 484-86 (D.N.M. 1992) (same).
13. 28 C.F.R. § 77.1 et sjM. (1997). These regulations established a federal "no-contacts" rule applicable to
"attorneys for the government" (defined to include federal prosecutors) and stated that this rule was intended to
"preempt and supercede the application of state laws and rules and local federal court rules to the extent that
they relate to contacts by attorneys for the government". 28 C.F.R. § 77.12 (1997).
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the ground that they had been issued "without valid statutory authority."14 The
Thornburgh Memorandum had been the subject of similar criticism.15
THE ATTORNEY SUBPOENA ISSUE: Meanwhile, a similar dispute between Justice
Department representatives and state ethics authorities emerged in connection
with the application of another ABA ethics rule, Rule 3.8(f), which places ethical
restrictions on a prosecutor's issuance of subpoenas to attorneys.1 6 As under Rule
4.2, the Department of Justice took the position, based on various legal doctrines,
that state ethics rules based on Rule 3.8(f) (and federal court rules based on such
state ethics rules) may not properly be applied to federal prosecutors. This issue
was litigated in a number of cases, with mixed results. 17
PASSAGE OF THE McDADE AMENDMENT: Thus, in 1998, when the McDade
Amendment was being considered, the issue whether federal prosecutors could
be disciplined under state ethical rules was very much in dispute. The McDade
Amendment resolved this debate by specifying that attorneys for the federal
government must follow state ethical rules. It added a new provision to Title 28
concerning "ethical standards for attorneys for the Government," applicable to
Justice Department attorneys who conduct criminal or civil enforcement
proceedings and to Independent Counsels and their employees. This new law,
which went into effect April 19, 1999, provides that:
An attorney for the Government shall be subject to State laws and rules, and
local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each state where such attorney
engages in that attorney's duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as
other attorneys in that State.
1 8
Consistent with this provision, the few court decisions that have been issued
since the enactment of Section 530B have upheld the application of rules based
on state ethics rules to federal prosecutors.19
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS: As- further directed by the McDade
Amendment, the Justice Department issued a set of interim regulations to
14. 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir. 1998).
15. See, e.g., In the Matter of Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.M. 1992).
16. MODEL RuLEs R. 3.8(0.
17. Cases that ruled against the Department's position included: Whitehouse v. U.S. District Court for the
District of Rhode Island, 53 F.3d 1349, 1351-52 (1st Cir. 1995) (federal court rule based on state ethics rule
3.8(f) may be validly applied to federal prosecutor's issuance of both grand jury and trial subpoenas); United
States v. Klubock, 832 E2d 664, 667 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc) (federal court rule based on predecessor to state
ethics Rule 3.8(f) may properly be applied to federal prosecutor).
Cases that upheld the Department's position included: Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Pa.,
975 F.2d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 1992) (neither state ethics rule modeled on Rule 3.8(0 nor federal court rule based on
that state rule may be applied to federal prosecutors).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 530B.
19. See United States v. Colorado Supreme Court, 189 E3d 1281, 1283 (10th Cir. 1999) (federal court rule
based on state ethics rule 3.8(0 may be enforced against federal prosecutors); Stem v. Supreme Judicial Court
for Mass., 184 F.R.D. 10, 19 (D. Mass. 1999) (same).
[Vol. 22:427
THE STATE OF RULE 3.8
implement Section 530B.20 These regulations have gone into immediate effect
pending the process of notice and comment. These regulations seek to resolve a
number of questions not directly addressed by the Amendment itself. Because the
regulations have been in effect for only six months, it is too early to know now
these rules will work in effect, or to predict all of the issues that may be raised.
SUBSEQUENT CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS: Moreover, since the passage of the
McDade Amendment, there have been other congressional efforts to repeal or
amend the law. Almost immediately upon passage of the law, Senator Hatch
introduced a bill (S. 250) that would have overturned the McDade Amendment
and delineated, as a matter of federal law, certain categories of punishable
conduct for federal prosecutors, to be enforced by the Attorney General. In March
of this year, as the McDade Amendment was about to become effective, Senator
Hatch introduced another bill (S. 755) that would have delayed its effective date
by another six months. Neither of these have been enacted.
In the same month, March 1999, the Senate Judiciary Committee sponsored a
hearing on "The Effect of State Ethics Rules on Federal Law Enforcement," at
which Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder gave testimony predicting that the
McDade Amendment would impede law enforcement. Mr. Holder raised, in
particular, the potential effects of state ethics rules such as Rule 4.2 (on contacts
with represented witnesses), Rule 3.3(d) (on ex parte communications with the
court), and Rule 3.8(f) (on issuing subpoenas to attorneys). Meanwhile, in April
of this year, Senator Leahy introduced his own bill (S. 855) to replace the
McDade Amendment with yet another provision. In more recent months,
however, none of these proposed measures have seen action in Congress.
EFFECT ON THE MODEL RULES: Finally, the effect of the McDade Amendments
on the ABA's Model Rules has not yet fully emerged. On the discrete issue of
Rule 4.2, a compromise was reached following the adoption of that Amendment,
which among other things, had the practical effect of disapproving the
substantive "no contacts" rule contained in the Justice Department's regulations
in favor of state "no contact" rules. In July of this year, this Commission reached
agreement with the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility to recommend changes to Rule 4.2 to address the Department's
concerns. At the same time, the basic stand-off between the Justice Department
and ethics authorities continued, as the Department would not agree to sign off on
the proposed changes to Rule 4.2.1
While the Department has raised a spectre of issues for federal law
enforcement stemming from the application of state ethical rules to federal
20. See 64 Fed. Reg. 19273 (April 20, 1999).
21. The proposed amendments to Rule 4.2 were drafted so as to meet the Department's concerns while
preserving the principle that Rule 4.2 (and other state ethical rules) should apply to federal prosecutors.,
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prosecutors,22 the Department has not at this point sought to achieve change
through proposing specific changes to the AB A's Model Rules. The effects that all
of the above developments may have for Rule 3.8 (as adopted by the ABA and
implemented in the states) are not yet clear.
CONCLUSION: In sum, while there has been a great deal of recent legislative,
regulatory and judicial activity in the area of state ethical supervision of federal
prosecutors, the complex issues surrounding these matters are still in flux. While,
as noted, federal prosecutors are in the minority of prosecutors nationwide, the
application of state ethics rules to federal prosecutors is of critical importance
because it promises to shift an increasing national focus to the content of state
ethics rules such as Rule 3.8 that apply to prosecutors. The Department of Justice
has already sought, in connection with the passage of the McDade Amendment,
to highlight certain state ethical rules which it believes unduly impede federal law
enforcement.23 The next phase of this debate may well focus on amending these
state ethical rules, as well as the Model Rules themselves. It is too early to predict
exactly how these developments will unfold.2 4
C. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS: ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS
In other developments, Model Rule 3.8 is also increasing in' importance
because of the growing restrictions on other means of ensuring ethical conduct by
prosecutors in connection with criminal prosecutions. While there are a number
of mechanisms, other than state ethical rules, that address prosecutorial
misconduct, many of these are increasingly limited in application because of
legal or practical limitations. This makes the use of such alternative sanctions
ineffective (and often inappropriate) as a comprehensive means of deterring and
punishing unethical conduct. For example:
REVERSAL OF CONVICTION: Courts have, in some cases, reversed convictions in
criminal cases because the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in connection with
-the trial. The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that reversal may not be
used primarily or simply to "discipline the prosecutor-and warn other prosecu-
22. Yet another variable in the mix is a pending proposal to adopt certain uniform ethical rules for federal
courts, which would thereby replace, at least in part, the practice of federal courts to rely on state ethical rules as
their rules of local practice.
23. See Concerning the Impact of 28 U.S.C. § 530B on Federal Law Enforcement Before the S. Subcomm. on
Original Justice Oversight, 106 th Cong. (statement of Eric H. holder Jr., Deputy Att'y Gen. of the United
States) (March 24, 1999).
24. One issue, in particular, that may arise in this regard is the meaning of Rule 3.4(b), which prohibits
offering inducements in exchange for witnesses' testimony, as that Rule may apply to prosecutorial agreements
giving immunity, sentencing concessions, or other benefits to cooperating witnesses. While the federal courts
recently considered, and rejected, the argument that federal prosecutors who offer immunity to witnesses run
afoul of the federal statutory bar on offering witnesses things "of value," see, e.g., United States v. Singleton,
165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc), some of those decisions also noted that such agreements may violate
Rule 3.4(b). At least one federal judge has predicted that the Singleton issue "may arise again" in the context of
state ethics rules based on Rule 3.4(b). Id. at 1302-03 (Henry, J., concurring).
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tors" that they must cease engaging in such misconduct. Rather, even if a
prosecutor has engaged in clear misconduct, the Court has held that reversal of a
conviction is not appropriate if the misconduct created error harmless to the
outcome of the trial.25
DISMISSAL OF INDICTMENT: Similarly, while the courts in some cases, have
dismissed indictments for prosecutorial misconduct occurring before the grand
jury, the Supreme Court has made clear the very high standard for such
dismissals, at least in the federal courts. A federal district court "exceeds its
powers in dismissing an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct not prejudicial
to the defendant." This requires a showing that the misconduct "substantially
influenced the grand jury's decision to indict" or at least caused "grave doubt" as
to whether the grand jury's decision was free from the influence of the
misconduct.2 6
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE: Exclusion of evidence at a criminal trial has also
been used by some courts as a sanction to punish prosecutorial misconduct in
connection with obtaining evidence against the defendant. Again, however,
commentators have noted that "the case law in many jurisdictions favors the
admission of the evidence obtained in violation of ethical rules, regardless of the
nature or severity of the ethical breach."27 As with other sanctions related to the
criminal conviction itself, courts are reluctant to reward the defendant, who may
be guilty of the charged offense, on the basis of the prosecutor's misconduct-
unless that misconduct clearly went directly to the prosecutor's ability to obtain
that conviction.
CONTEMPT OF COURT AND OTHER JUDICIAL SANCTIONS: A court may also cite a
prosecutor for contempt of court as a punishment for unethical conduct. The
Supreme Court has suggested that such an alternative might be used, for example,
instead of dismissal of an indictment.28 In practice, however, contempt reportedly
is "rarely invoked as a sanction for prosecutorial misconduct.",29 Similarly, while
the Supreme Court has also suggested such other judicial sanctions as "chastis-
[ing] the prosecutor in a published opinion," 30 in practice, even when such
opinions are issued by the courts, "only rarely does the court identify the
offending prosecutor by name.",3 1 This significantly reduces the effectiveness of
25. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 504 (1983); see also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 14
(1985) (where timely objection is not made, prosecutorial misconduct during trial provides grounds for reversal
of conviction only where misconduct creates "plain error").
26. See Bank of N. S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1988); see also Williams v. United States, 504
U.S. 36 (1992) (court may not dismiss an otherwise valid indictment on grounds that prosecutor failed to
disclose to grand jury evidence exculpatory to defendant).
27. Lyn M. Morton, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct: Suppression, Dismissal or
Discipline?, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETrmcs 1083, 1101-1102 (1994).
28. See Bank of N.S., 487 U.S. at 263.
29. See GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 4, at 13-13.
30. Bank of N.S., 487 U.S. at 263.
31. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 4, at 13-15.
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such sanctions.
CiviL LAWSUITS: While a defendant may bring suit against a prosecutor
seeking damages for prosecutorial misconduct under the federal civil rights laws,
28 U.S.C. § 1983, such suits are unlikely to prevail in most cases because, under
Supreme Court decisions in this area, a prosecutor has absolute immunity from
civil suit in the exercise of his or her duties as an advocate,32 and qualified
immunity in connection with the exercise of his or her other official duties.3 3
SELF-REGULATION: There are also internal rules and mechanisms in place by
which prosecutors' offices regulate the conduct of their own attorneys. For
example, the Justice Department has established the Office of Professional
Responsibility, an independent office set up to investigate and impose appropriate
discipline on federal prosecutors in response to complaints of prosecutorial
misconduct. While such self-regulation is a critical element and should be
encouraged, courts have not accepted the argument that such mechanisms are
sufficient, standing alone, as a means of ensuring ethical conduct by prosecu-
tors.34
HYDE AMENDMENT. Finally, with respect to federal prosecutors, the congres-
sional passage in 1997 of the Hyde Amendment, which allows defendants who
are acquitted at trial to recover their attorney's fees in limited circumstances, was
also intended as a means of deterring prosecutorial abuses. To prevail, a
defendant must show, among other things, that the prosecution was "vexatious,
frivolous or in bad faith, '35 a high standard for recovery. A recent report indicates
that only seventy-six petitions have been filed in the last two years, and that
criminal defendants have so far prevailed seven times.3 6
In sum, while prosecutors are subject to a variety of other disciplinary
mechanisms that seek to deter unethical conduct, there are many limitations on
these alternative sanctions. This makes state ethical rules-and the Model Rules
providing guidance for such state rules-an increasingly important means of
ensuring ethical conduct by this part of the bar. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
expressly justified placing restrictions on other remedies, such as civil suits
against prosecutors seeking damages, by citing the existence of state ethical rules
that punish prosecutorial misconduct.3 7 These trends focus increasing attention
on Rule 3.8 and related ABA ethical rules.
32. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
33. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991).
34. See, e.g., Stem v. Supreme Judicial Court for Mass., 184 F.R.D. 10, 19 (D. Mass. 1999) (rejecting
argument that attorney-client relationship is "adequately protected by the Department of Justice guidelines for
attorney subpoenas," and noting that passage of McDade Amendment "signals Congress' belief that the [DOJ]
guidelines are insufficient").
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, Note (Pub. L. 105-119, Title VI, § 617 (Nov. 26, 1997), 111 Stat. 2519).
36. See Sam Skolnik, Little to Hyde After 2 Years, LEGAL TiEs, at 1 (Nov. 29, 1999).
37. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429.
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PART II: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING PROVISIONS OF RULE 3.8
RULE 3.8(A) - PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIREMENT
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause;...
ABA Model Rule 3.8(a) concerns the prosecutor's basic obligation not to
pursue unfounded charges. It is one of two requirements that were originally
contained in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.38 Model Rule 3.8(a)
has been adopted verbatim in at least thirty-five states.39 A number of other states
have variations of this Rule that are similar, but not identical.
A number of states, and other model rules, have adopted comparable ethical
rules that address certain issues not explicitly addressed in Model Rule 3.8(a),
which the Commission may want to consider adding to the Rule or its
Commentary. These include:
1. DUTY NOT TO CONTINUE PROSECUTION OF UNFOUNDED CHARGES
Certain states' rules spell out, in express terms, that the obligation not to
'prosecute" charges not supported by probable cause encompasses not only the
obligation not to initiate such charges but also the obligation not to continue to
prosecute such charges if the evidence should change.
California, for example, provides that where a prosecutor who is responsible
for prosecuting criminal charges "becomes aware that those charges are not
supported by probable cause," the prosecutor must "promptly so advise the court
38. MODEL CODE DR 7-103(A), provided that:
A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal
charges when he or she knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause.
39. See ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 3.8(a); ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(a); Az. RULES
OF PROF'L CoNDucr, R. 42, ER 3.8(a); ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(a); COLO. RULES OF PROF'L
CoNDucT R. 3.8(a); CT. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(a); DEL. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(a); FLA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 4-3.8(a); IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(a); IND. RULES OF PRO'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8(a); KAN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuC, R. 226, R. 3.8(a); LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr
R. 3.8(A)(a); MD. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCr, R. 16-812, R. 3.8(a); MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a);
MIcH. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(a); MN. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(a); Miss. RULEs OF PROF'L
CoNDucr R. 3.8(a); Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(a); MT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.8(a); NaV.
RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 3.8; N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 3.8(a); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT
R. 3.8(a); N.M. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 16-308(A); N.C. R. BAR R. 3.8(a); 5 OKLA. ST. Cm'. 1, APPX 3-A,
R. 3.8 (hereinafter OKLA. R. 3.8(a)); PA. R.P.C. R. 3.8(a); R. I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 3.8(a); S.C. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.8(a); S. D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8(a); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R.
3.8(a); VT. RUtS OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.8(a); WA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.8(a); W. VA. RULES OF
PROF'L CoNDuT R. 3.8(a); Wis. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, SCR 20: R. 3.8(a); Wyo. RULES OF PROF'L
CoNDucr R. 3.8(a).
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in which the criminal matter is pending." 4 The D.C. Rules also address this
circumstance, providing that a prosecutor may not "file in court or maintain" a
charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.4 The
Kentucky rules address this situation by providing that a prosecutor "at all stages
of a proceeding" shall refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor
knows is not supported by probable cause.42
The ABA's Prosecution Function Standards, similarly, spell this out expressly,
providing that:
A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the
continued pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the
charges are not supported by probable cause.43
RECOMMENDATION: The principle that the prosecutor should neither institute
nor permit the continued pendency of charges that are not supported by probable
cause is an important one that should be spelled out in the Rule or its
Commentary. This clarification could be accomplished by a minor amendment in
the language of Rule 3.8(a) to delete the word "prosecuting" and substitute
language similar to that in the D.C. rules, to the effect that a prosecutor shall
refrain from "filing in court or maintaining" a charge that the prosecutor knows is
not supported by probable cause. Alternatively, the Commentary could be
amended to make clear that the Rule's reference to refraining from "prosecuting"
is intended to encompass all of these concepts.
2. KNOWLEDGE OR "REASON TO KNOW"
Some states extend Model Rule 3.8 to go beyond the prosecutor's actual
"knowledge" that probable cause does not exist to cover, more broadly, situations
in which the prosecutor "should have known" or where it "was obvious" that
probable cause did not exist.
California, for example, prohibits prosecuting criminal charges that the
prosecutor "knows or should know" are not supported by probable cause.
44
Illinois similarly prohibits a prosecutor from instituting charges where the lawyer
knows "or reasonably should know" that the charges are not supported by
probable cause.4a Hawaii, Maine and New York bar a prosecutor from instituting
criminal charges where the lawyer knows "or it is obvious" that the charges are
40. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 5-110.
41. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCT R. 3.8(b).
42. Ky. RuLFs OF PROF'L CoNDUCT SCR 3.130(3.8(a)).
43. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRMNAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FuNCrION, STANDARD 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993).
44. CAL. RULEs OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 5-220.
45. ILL. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 3.8(a). direct quote.
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not supported by probable cause.4 6
RECOMMENDATION: An amendment to broaden the "knowledge" requirement
of Rule 3.8(a) is not advisable. Were the Rule to be changed to add a "reason to
know" provision, it would be inconsistent with the general approach of the Model
Rules, which use "knowledge" to mean "actual knowledge of the fact in
question., 47 It is notable that similar language included in the ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility (which also covered the filing of charges where "it
is obvious" that probable cause does not exist) was deleted by the ABA in
adopting the Model Rules.4 8 While some states have carried over such provisions
into their current ethical rules, such an amendment would inject an undesirable
degree of uncertainty into the Rule.
3. HIGHER STANDARD THAN PROBABLE CAUSE
The ABA's Prosecution Function Standards both adopt the "probable cause"
standard for initiating criminal charges and also contain a higher standard than
mere "probable cause" for maintaining such charges. After citing the "probable
cause" standard, noted above, they go on to provide further that:
A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued
pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence
to support a conviction.49
Similarly, the National Prosecution Standards, issued by the National District
Attorneys Association, a major prosecutor's organization, also set a higher bar
than the "probable cause" standard espoused by Model Rule 3.8(a). These
prosecutorial standards call upon a prosecutor to file "only those charges which
he reasonably believes can be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial." 50
A similar rule has been adopted in at least one state. The District of Columbia
rules provide, in addition to the "probable cause" standard, that a prosecutor also
may not "prosecute to trial a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by
evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of guilt."
51
RECOMMENDATION: The Commission should consider adopting an additional
subsection to Rule 3.8, comparable to the above rules, that would bar a prosecutor
from instituting or maintaining criminal charges when he or she does not believe
that they can be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial.
46. HAWAu RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCr R. 3.8(a); ME. CODE PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, R. 3.7(i)(1); N.Y CODE
PROF. RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-103(A) (same).
47. ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
at xviii (3d ed. 1995).
48. See MODEL CODE DR 7-103(A).
49. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function, Standard 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993).
50. NDAA, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, § 43.3 (2d ed. 1991).
51. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.8(c).
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The "probable cause" standard is a very minimal requirement. In certain
circumstances, it would allow a prosecutor to pursue charges, for example, even
if he or she knew that the existing evidence-and, more importantly, the evidence
that could be admitted at trial-would not be sufficient to sustain a conviction.
For these reasons, a broader rule has been endorsed by the ABA and by a major
prosecutors' association.
If the Commission were to adopt such a rule, it would require a change to the
black letter Rule. One option would be to adopt a new subsection, to be inserted
after subsection (a), that would add language (combining the D.C. rule and the
ABA Prosecution Function Standards) to the effect that a prosecutor should
"refrain from prosecuting to trial a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by admissible evidence sufficient to support a conviction." This would
allow a slightly lower standard for the filing of initial charges (based on probable
cause only), but would make clear a prosecutor's obligation to dismiss charges as
soon as it becomes clear to him or her that the admissible evidence will be
insufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction.
4. APPLICATION TO UNFOUNDED GRAND JURY INDIcTMENTs
An unusual variation on Rule 3.8 is contained in a comment to the Texas
version of this rule, which provides that it does not apply:
to situations where the prosecutor is using a grand jury to determine whether
any crime has been committed, nor does it prevent a prosecutor from presenting
a matter to a grand jury even though he has some doubt as to what charge, if
any, the grand jury may decide is appropriate, so long as he believes the grand
jury could reasonably conclude that some charge is proper.52
To the extent that this may suggest that Texas would allow a prosecutor to
present to the grand jury an indictment that a prosecutor did not know to be
supported by probable cause, most rules do not contain any such limitation.
Indeed, a number of states have specifically addressed this issue by specifying,
in contrast to the Model Rule language, that a prosecutor is barred from
"instituting or causing to be instituted" charges not supported by probable cause
(as opposed to "refrain from prosecuting," the phrase used in the Model Rule).53
The ABA Prosecution Function Standards, similarly, cover not only instituting
but also "causing to be instituted" criminal charges that lack probable cause.54
Such language clearly covers the situation where a prosecutor has "caused" the
grand jury to issue the charges.
52. Tx. DiSCIPIjNARY RuLES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 3.09(a), cmt. (2).
53. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 5-110; HAWAn RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8; ILL.
RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 3.8(b); ME. RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 3.7(i)(1).
54. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARD 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993).
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RECOMMENDATION: Only one state has raised this issue as a question in
controversy, which suggests that the existing Rule is clear enough on this point.
However, the concept that Model Rule 3.8 covers not only the institution of
criminal charges through the filing of an information, which is within the
prosecutor's control, but also through a grand jury indictment, which is not
directly issued by the prosecutor, is an important one. If the Commission feels
that the existing language ("prosecuting") or the proposed modification thereto
("filing in court or maintaining") are not clear enough to cover charges issued by
the grand jury, this point could be clarified in Commentary.
5. THREATENING UNSUPPORTED CRIMINAL CHARGES
At least one state, Texas, has a version of Rule 3.8 that covers not only
prosecuting but also "threatening to prosecute" a charge that the prosecutor
knows is not supported by probable cause.55 The ABA Guilty Plea standards take
a similar position in the context of plea negotiations, providing that:
In connection with plea negotiations, the prosecuting attorney should not bring
or threaten to bring charges against the defendant or another person, or refuse
to dismiss such charges, , here admissible evidence does-not exist to support
the charges or the prosecuting attorney has no good faith intention of pursuing
those charges.56
The American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure,
section 350.3(3)(a) similarly bars a prosecutor from "charging or threatening to
charge the defendant with a crime not supported by facts believed to be
provable."
RECOMMENDATION: The issue of "threatening" unsupported charges should not
be dealt with in the context of amending Rule 3.8(a), which simply addresses the
more limited issue of the evidentiary basis for filing and prosecuting charges.
Rather, such an issue is distinct enough that, if the Commission were to consider
it, it would be preferable to do so in the context of a new proposed subsection of
the Rule. This issue should therefore be considered, if at all, as part of an overall
review and expansion of Model Rule 3.8, a subject addressed in Section III, infra.
RULE 3.8(B) - DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:...
55. Tx. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.09(a).
56. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY, STANDARD 14-3.1(h) (3d ed. 1999) (emphasis
added).
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(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of
the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given
reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;...
Like the above rule, ABA Model Rule 3.8(b) has been widely adopted in the
states, and is- an ethical rule in at least thirty-four jurisdictions.57 The ABA
Prosecution Function Standards also contain a similar rule.58
This rule has largely gone without remark, and only one issue of any note
appears in variations of this provision contained in the state ethical rules:
1. LIMITATION TO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
Two states, Texas and Wyoming, would not generally require the prosecutor to
undertake efforts to ensure the defendant has been advised of the right to counsel,
but would impose such a duty in connection with questioning an unrepresented
person who is accused of a criminal offense.
Texas requires only that the prosecutor "refrain from conducting or assisting in
a custodial interrogation of an accused unless" the prosecutor has made
reasonable efforts "to be assured" that the accused has been advised of "any"
right to counsel.5 9 Commentary to the Texas rule states that this does not forbid
the "lawful questioning" of any person who has "knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily waived the rights to counsel and to silence," nor would it apply with
respect to questioning a defendant who is not entitled to appointed counsel and
has not expressed a desire to retain counsel.6 °
Wyoming provides, similarly, that "prior to interviewing an accused or prior to
counselling a law enforcement officer with respect to interviewing an accused,"
the prosecutor must make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been
57. ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(l)(b); ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); Aiuz. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT ER 3.8(b); ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.8(b); CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.3.8(b); DEL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); IDAHO RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.8(b); Ky. RULES OF PROF'L, CONDUCT, SCR 3.130(3.8)(b); LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(A)(b); MD.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); MICH. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); MisS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b);
Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 3.8(b); MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 3.8(b); NEV. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, R. 3.8(a); N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT, RCP 3.8(b);
N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 3.8(b); OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); S.C.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); S. D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); VT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b);
W.VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b); Wis. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, SCR 20:3.8(c).
58. See, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, § 3-3.10(a) (1993) ("A prosecutor should not fail to make
reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining,
counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel.").
59. TEx. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.09(b)
60. 11x. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.09 cmt 3.
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advised of the right to counsel. 61 These rules appear to be addressed at the
realistic fact that, in many instances, the prosecutor will have no contact with the
defendant before the first court appearance, and thus may not have any
opportunity before that time to make "reasonable efforts" to ensure that he or she
has been advised of the right to counsel.62
RECOMMENDATION: Existing Rule 3.8(b) appears to be adequate and noncontro-
versial, and should not require either amendment or clarification. In most
circumstances, the prosecutor's duty to ensure that the defendant is aware of the
right to counsel, and is given the opportunity to obtain counsel, should be fulfilled
by the judge's advisement to the defendant at his or her first appearance.63 If this
does not happen, it is appropriate, and in the interests of justice, to call upon the
prosecutor to take other steps to ensure that the defendant is not required to
engage in any substantive proceedings without knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waiving any right to counsel. Obviously, if no right to counsel
attaches in a particular case, Rule 3.8(b) will have no applicability.
RULE 3.8(C) -WAIVER OF RIGHTS OF UNREPRESENTED DEFENDANT
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: ...
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of
important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;...
ABA Model Rule 3.8(c) has been adopted verbatim in at least thirty-one
states.64 The ABA Prosecution Function Standards contain an identical stan-
61. Wyo. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 3.8(b)
62. The same issue appears to have prompted the variation on Rule 3.8(b) in New Mexico, which provides
that "prior to appearing in a court proceeding where a defendant appears without counsel," the prosecutor shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the defendant is advised of the right to counsel. N.M. RULES OF PROF'L
CoNDuCT R. 16-308(B)
63. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, § 3-3.10(a), Commentary at 79 (1993) ("With respect to the right
to counsel, a prosecutor has acted reasonably and properly under this Standard if her or she simply lets the judge
raise this subject with the accused.").
64. ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.8(1)(c); ARiz. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT ER 3.8(c); ARK. RULES
OF PROF'L CoNDoUCT R. 3.8(c); CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8(c); DEL. RULES OF PROF'L CoNnucr R.
3.8(c); FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-3.8(b); IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c); IND. RULES OF
PROF'LCONDUCT R. 3.8(c); KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 3.8(c); LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R.
3.8(A)(c); MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.8(c); MIcH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8(c); MINN. RULES
OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 3.8(c); MISS. RULES OF PROF'L CoNuCr R. 3.8(c); Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.8(c); MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.8(c); NEv. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT, R. 3.8(c); N.H. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c); N. M. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.8(c); N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c); OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c); PA. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c); R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c); S.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c);
S. D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L
CoNDuT R. 3.8(c); W.VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.8(c); Wis. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, SCR
20:3.8(d); Wyo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c).
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dard.65 While this rule appears to have been largely uncontroversial in practice,
several issues have been noted by commentators:
1. BLACK LETTER VS. COMMENTARY
In several states, concepts included in the ABA's Commentary to Model Rule
3.8 have been incorporated in the black letter.66 In Colorado, for example, the
black letter rule provides that Rule 3.8(c) does not apply "to an accused appearing
pro se with the approval of the tribunal," and that it does not "forbid the lawful
questioning of a suspect who has waived the rights to counsel and silence."67 In
Massachusetts, similarly, the rule has been amended to provide that a prosecutor
shall not seek waiver of important pretrial rights from unrepresented defendant
"unless a court has first obtained from the accused a knowing and intelligent
written waiver of counsel. 68
RECOMMENDATION: The Model Rule's inclusion of the above concepts in
Commentary, rather than black letter, appears appropriate. These amendments
are not substantive in nature, and should not require any amendment to Rule
3.8(c).
2. BROADER RULE
The comparable rule in Texas extends not only to the waiver of "pretrial" rights
but more broadly provides that a prosecutor should "not initiate or encourage
efforts to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial,
trial, or post-trial rights" (additional language underlined).69
RECOMMENDATION: It should not be necessary to expand Rule 3.8(c) to cover
rights other than pretrial rights. The Rule focuses on pretrial rights because it is
during this period-especially in connection with a preliminary hearing-that the
defendant is least likely to have either been appointed counsel, notified by the
court of his or her right to counsel, or been permitted by the court to enter a
knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. Because a court may not allow trial to
proceed without a defendant who is entitled to counsel either having obtained
counsel or properly waived that right, the prosecutor's dealings with the
defendant after that point should be of less concern. Thus, the additional language
included in the Texas rule should not be necessary.
65. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Part 1, Standard 3-3.10(c) (3d
ed. 1993).
66. That Comment (Comment 2 to Model Rule 3.8) provides that: "Paragraph (c) does not apply to an
accused appearing pro se with the approval of the tribunal. Nor does it forbid the lawful questioning of a suspect
who has knowingly waived the rights to counsel and silence."
67. Compare COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 3.8(c) with MODEL RULE 3.8(c), cmt 2.
68. MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c).
69. Thx. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.09(c).
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3. ABOLITION OR CLARIFICATION OF THE RULE
In a letter to the Commission, it is the position of Department of Justice
attorney Stephen J. Csontos that Rule 3.8(c) is unnecessary. He argues that "a
complete prohibition on all waivers [of pretrial rights] is not needed to deter
abuse," since a conviction will not be sustained if the prosecutor cannot "bear the
heavy burden of proving a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver on the part
of an accused." He argues, further, that it makes no sense not to allow a defendant
to waive pretrial rights, which are not constitutionally conferred, when constitu-
tional rights may "freely be waived.",
70
With all due respect, this argument appears to be based on a misreading of the
rule. Rule 3.8(c) does not forbid the defendant's waiver of any rights (including
pretrial rights). Rather, it simply controls the timing of such waivers. The Rule
simply seeks to ensure that a prosecutor will not induce an unrepresented
defendant to waive such rights at a time before he or she has had the right to
counsel explained, and has knowingly and voluntarily waived that right. This is a
sound rule which has not generally been subject to criticism and, as noted, is also
recognized in other ABA standards.
Mr. Csontos has also suggested that certain clarifications be made in the Rule:
First, he has suggested that the reference in the black letter rule to an "accused"
and in the Commentary to a "suspect" is confusing, and that "consistent
terminology should be used." However, the distinction in terminology is
deliberate. It is intended to distinguish between a prosecutor's dealings with an
"accused," who has been charged with an offense, and the questioning of a
"suspect," who has not been charged. It would therefore not be advisable to
eliminate this distinction.71
Second, he suggests that the reference to "important" pretrial rights is unduly
vague, and that additional examples of such rights be included. This suggestion is
addressed below.
7 2
Finally he suggests including an exception in the rule for "situations in which
an individual has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel."
With respect to this issue, the Commentary already addresses this issue by
70. Letter from Stephen J. Csontos to Nancy Moore, Chief Reporter, ABA Commission on Evaluation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct (September 10, 1999).
71. A similar point is reflected in an amendment, in one state, to the effect that the prosecutor may not seek to
obtain from an unrepresented defendant a waiver of important "post-indictment" pretrial rights. N.J. RULES OF
PROF'L CoNDucr, RCP 3.8(c). The state's Commentary explains that this change was made "to conform more
closely to decisional law" holding that "[p]reindictment consent to search or interrogation does not invoke the
same Sixth Amendment concerns" regarding the right to counsel. However, for the same reasons noted above,
such a change is unnecessary in light of the limitation of Model Rule 3.8(c), on its face, to an "accused" (as
opposed to a "suspect"), which necessarily implies that charges have already been brought.
72. See Letter From Stephen J. Csontos To Nancy Moore, Chief Reporter, ABA Comission on Evaluation of
the Rules and Prof'l Conduct at 3 (Sept. 10, 1991) (quoting A PROSECUTOR'S "SPEcIAL REsPONSIBILrrIEs" UNDER
THE STATE BAR RULES, 28 Thx. PROSECUTOR 21 (1999)).
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explaining that Rule 3.8(c) "does not apply to an accused appearing pro se with
the approval of the tribunal." Such approval is only granted by the court after
ensuring that the defendant has entered a knowing, voluntary and intelligent
waiver of the right to counsel. Thus, this Comment already recognizes the
exception Mr. Csontos is proposing.
RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons stated above, Rule 3.8(c) has been widely
adopted, without notable controversy, and there is no compelling reason to make
changes in the black letter at this time. While this obligation is not one of the most
important duties set forth in the Rule, it would send an undesirable signal to
eliminate it outright.
With respect to Mr. Csontos' suggestion that additional examples of "impor-
tant" pretrial rights be provided, this could be done in Commentary, if the
Commission desires to do so. However, a preliminary hearing is the primary
example of a pretrial right for which the prosecutor may seek a waiver before the
court has advised the defendant of the right to counsel (and entered any proper
waiver of this right),73 and inclusion of additional examples would not add
significantly to this standard.
RULE 3.8(D) - DISCLOSURE OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:...
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the
defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known
to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor' is relieved of this
responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal;...
ABA Model Rule 3.8(d) is an important provision that sets out the prosecutor's
ethical obligation to furnish exculpatory evidence to the defense. It is one of the
-two provisions that were originally contained in the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, and was adopted in substance virtually unchanged from that
rule.74
Model Rule 3.8(d) has been adopted verbatim in at least thirty-one states.75
73. See ABA CRjImNAL JuSTICE SEcION STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FuNcrnON, Part 1, Standard 3-3.10(c),
commentary at 80 (3d ed. 1993).
74. MODEL CODE DR 7-103(B) (1980), provided that:
A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall make timely disclosure to
counsel for the defendant, or to a defendant who has no counsel, of the existence of evidence, known
to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the
degree of the offense or reduce the punishment.
75. ALASKA Ru..Es OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 3.8(d); ARiZ. RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDuCr, ER 3.8(d); ARK. RuLEs
OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(d); COLO. RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr 3.8(d); Cor. RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R.
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Several other states have adopted the rule with minor variations.7 6 The more
substantive issues include the following.
1. PROSECUTOR'S STATE OF MIND
A few states have variations on this rule that contain additional restrictions on
the prosecutor's state of mind. For example, the comparable Alabama rule adds
language requiring that the prosecutor have "willfully fail[ed]" to make timely
disclosure to the defense of the material called for by the rule.77 The District of
Columbia rules, similarly, emphasize that a prosecutor may not "intentionally fail
to disclose to the defense" the evidence covered by the rule.78 The ABA's
Prosecution Function Standards also specify that a prosecutor should not
"intentionally fail" to make timely disclosure of exculpatory evidence. 79 The
California rules, more narrowly, do not address a disclosure obligation at all, but
simply provide that a prosecutor may not "suppress any evidence" that the
prosecution "has a legal obligation to reveal or to produce."8°
RECOMMENDATION: Existing Rule 3.8(d) already contains an intent require-
ment in that it only requires the disclosure of exculpatory evidence or information
"known to the prosecutor.'' 81 Thus, even under the existing Rule, a prosecutor's
inadvertent failure to disclose evidence or information that is in his or her
3.8(4); DEL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d); FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 4-3.8(c); IDAHO RULES OF
PROF'L CONDuCr R. 3.8(d); IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d); KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.8(d); Ky. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, SCR 3.130(3.8)(c); LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d); MD.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d); MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.8(d); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8(d); Miss. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8(d); Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d);
MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d); NEv. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr, R. 3.8(d); N.H. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8(d); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 3.8(d) additional language used; OKLA. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R.3.8(d); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr 3.8(d); R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 3.8(d); S.C.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 3.8(d); TEx. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.09(d); VT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 3.8(d); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d); W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d); WIS. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT, SCR 20:3.8(f)(1); Wyo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.3.8(d). See also, e.g., ILL. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b) (adopting similar language from DR 7-103(B)); ME. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.7(i)(2) (same); MicH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (minor variation in language).
76. Several states have deleted the requirement, in the Model Rule, that exculpatory information produced at
the time of sentencing be disclosed to both the defendant and "to the tribunal." See HAWAn RULES OF PROF'L
CoNDUcr 3.8(b); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 3.8(d). One state has changed the requirement that the
evidence "tend to negate guilt" to a requirement that it "supports innocence." N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT,
RPC 3.8(d). One state has added a requirement that the mitigating evidence produced at sentencing be
"reasonably relevant." N.M. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 16-308(D).
77. ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d).
78. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e).
79. ABA STANDARD FOR CRIMiNAL JUSTICE, Standard 3-3.11(a) (3d ed. 1993). By contrast, the NDAA's
National Prosecution Standards simply provide that a prosecutor "should disclose the existence or nature of
exculpatory evidence pertinent to the defense," without including any knowledge or intent requirement. NDAA,
NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, § 25.4 (2d ed. 1991).
80. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5-220.
81. While the letter from Justice Department attorney Csontos suggesis that the Model Rule no longer
contains the "knowledge" limitation that was included in the Model Code, this is not the case.
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possession, but that he or she does not know about (or understand to be
exculpatory), would not be penalized. While adding a "willful" requirement
would further strengthen this intent requirement, most jurisdictions have not seen
fit to do so. The Rule appears to have been largely uncontroversial in practice,
and such an amendment should not be necessary.
2. TIMING OF DIscLosuREs
Several states have strengthened the rule by adding requirements concerning
the specific timing with which the disclosures must be made. The District of
Columbia rules, for example, provide that the disclosure must be made "at a time
when use by the defense is reasonably feasible. 82 The North Dakota rules
require that the disclosures be made "at the earliest practical time."83
RECOMMENDATION: The existing rule addresses the timeliness issue by
requiring that the disclosure of exculpatory evidence be "timely." This language
should suffice to ensure that the disclosures are made at a time when they can
reasonably be used by the defense.
3. NEED FOR A DEFENSE REQUEST
Justice Department attorney Csontos states that "under federal law, a
prosecutor's obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence is triggered by a request
from the defense." He argues, on this basis, that this Rule could penalize a
prosecutor who had complied with federal requirements, and suggests amending
the language of this Rule to proscribe, instead, only the "intentional failure to
disclose exculpatory information when requested by the defense."
There are several reasons why Model Rule 3.8(d) does not include a
requirement that the defendant must request exculpatory material to trigger a
prosecutor's disclosure obligation.
First, it is not true that there is no federal obligation to produce exculpatory
evidence absent a request by the defense. Mr. Csontos appears to be referring to
the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 16, which require a
defense "request" before the prosecutor is required to disclose certain types of
pretrial discovery (principally, statements of the defendant, the defendant's prior
record, material documents and test reports, and expert testimony). As the
Commentary to Rule 16 explains, however, with respect to exculpatory evidence:
[T]here are situations in which due process will require the prosecution, on its
own, to disclose evidence 'helpful' to the defense. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
82. D.C. RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(e).
83. N.D. RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(d).
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The Supreme Court made clear, in Kyles v. Whitley, that "a defendant's failure
to request favorable evidence [does] not leave the Government free of all
obligation." 84 Rather, "regardless of request," as a matter of constitutional law,
the prosecutor must disclose to the defense favorable evidence that is "material"
to the case.85
The same distinction between exculpatory evidence and other types of
discovery is reflected in the NDAA's National Prosecution Standards, which
contain no requirement for a defense request to trigger the prosecutor's
obligations to disclose helpful evidence.86
Second, the ABA has consciously rejected including a requirement that a
defendant have requested the material in order to trigger a prosecutor's obligation
to disclose exculpatory evidence. The ABA Discovery Standards, for example,
require the prosecutor to disclose-with or without a request by defense
counsel-"any material or information within the prosecutor's possession or
control which tends to negate the guilt of the defendant as to the offense charged
or which would tend to reduce the punishment of the defendant., 87 As the
Commentary to this provision explains, the Standards deliberately omit any
requirement for a defense request, not only because such a request is not
constitutionally required, but also because:
A requirement that a request be made to obtain such discovery can become a
trap for unknowledgeable defense counsel, and is contrary to the discovery
standards' objective to eliminate game-playing. 88
RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons stated above, it is appropriate that Rule
3.8(d) not be limited to a situation where a defendant has requested the disclosure
of helpful information, but rather impose a broader obligation on the prosecutor.
4. ETICAL OBLIGATION BEYOND CONSTITUTIONAL MNIMUM
While not raised by Mr. Csontos, it should be noted that Rule 3.8(d) imposes
an ethical obligation that goes beyond the prosecutor's constitutional obligation
in certain other respects.
As the Supreme Court has observed, Rule 3.8(d) is broader than the
constitutional requirement set forth in cases like Brady, Kyles, Agurs, and
84. 514 U.S. 419,433 (1995) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)).
85. Id. at 434. In this context, "materiality" means that there is a "reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 433-34
(quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
86. Compare NDAA, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, § 53.5 (no defense request required for disclosure
of exculpatory evidence), with id., §§ 53.1, 53.2 (defense request required for certain other discovery
disclosures) (3d ed. 1991).
87. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTicE, DiscovERY, Standard I1-2.1(a)(viii) (3d ed. 1995).
88. Id., Commentary at 32-33.
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Bagley. While due process calls for the disclosure of "material" exculpatory
evidence, this constitutional standard "requires less of the prosecution than the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, which call generally for prosecutorial
disclosures of any evidence tending to exculpate or mitigate. 89
This choice, however, was made deliberately. In adopting the same principle in
the Prosecution Function Standards, the ABA consciously recognized that the
requirement so adopted "goes beyond the corollary duty imposed upon prosecu-
tors by constitutional law."90 Such a rule helps to implement the Supreme Court's
observation that, even if not constitutionally required, a prosecutor should
"resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure."91 This is in keeping with the
prosecutor's role as the representative of a sovereignty whose interest in a
criminal prosecution is "not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done.
92
Finally, it is also noteworthy that the same disclosure rule is endorsed by a
major prosecutors' organization, the NDAA,9 3 as well as by the Uniform Rules of
Criminal Procedure,94 without any limitation to "material" evidence. In essence,
this reflects a judgment that the prosecutor should turn over all potentially
exculpatory evidence to the defense, and let defense counsel determine whether
or not that evidence is material to his or her case.
RECOMMENDATION: The ABA's decision to impose an ethical disclosure
obligation concerning exculpatory evidence that goes beyond the constitutional
minimum is an appropriate judgment that has been widely accepted in the states,
and should not be upset.
RULE 3.8(E) -EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS BY STAFF
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:...
(e) exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement
personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the
prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that
the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6;...
89. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added). The Court cited both ABA Prosecution Function Standard
3-3.11 (a) and Model Rule 3.8(d).
90. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRMIINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCION, Standard 3-3.1 (a), Commentary at 82.
91. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108).
92. Id. (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
93. See NDAA, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, § 53.5 (2d ed. 1991) ("The prosecutor should disclose
to the defense any material or information within his actual knowledge and within his possession and control
which tends to negate or reduce the guilt of the defendant pertaining to the offense charged.").
94. See UNIFORM RuLES OF CRIMINAL PRocEouRE, R. 422(a)(5) (NCCUSL 1992),(prosecutor shall furnish to
the defense a statement "describing any matter or information known to the prosecuting attorney which may not
be known to the defendant and which tends to negate the defendant's guilt as to the crime charged or would tend
to mitigate the penalty").
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ABA Model Rule 3.8(e) was added in 1983. It is intended to require a
prosecutor to exercise reasonable care to prevent other law enforcement
personnel from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor himself or
herself would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6.
Model Rule 3.8(e) has been adopted verbatim in twenty-eight states.95 It has
also been adopted, with minor variations, in an additional six states.96 It does not
appear that any. significant issues have been raised concerning the application of
this rule.
RECOMMENDATION: There is no need to consider any changes to Model Rule
3.8(e).
RULE 3.8(F) - SUBPOENAS ISSUED TO LAWYERS
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:...
(f) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to
present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor
reasonably believes:
(1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any
applicable privilege;
(2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of
an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and
(3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information;...
ABA Model Rule 3.8(f) concerns a prosecutor's ethical duties when he or she
causes a subpoena to be issued to another lawyer. This provision has been the
subject of significant debate and litigation, principally as concerns the application
of the rule to federal prosecutors.
HISTORY OF PROVISION: This provision has its origin in a resolution passed by
95. ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e); ARiz. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUT, ER 3.8(e); ARK. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e); COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e); CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.8(5); DEL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f); IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f); IND. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f); KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.8(f); LA. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(e);
MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e); MICH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e); MIss. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8(e); Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e); MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e);
NEV. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT, R 3.8(f); N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f); N.M. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, R. 16-308(E); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.8(e);
R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e); S.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f); S.D. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8(f); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f); W.
VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 3.8(e); Wis. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, SCR 20: 3.8(f)(2); Wyo. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e) (not verbatim).
96. In most of these, the rule was changed to clarify that the prosecutor's obligation is limited to those
employees under his or her control, as opposed to all persons "assisting or associated with" the prosecutor. See
ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e); MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT 3.8(e); TEx. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Rule 3.09(e). In several other states, the rule was amended to
change the prosecutor's duty to take "reasonable care" to a duty to make "reasonable efforts." N.D. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e); OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e). None of these changes is substantive.
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the ABA in 1988 that limited the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and
other criminal proceedings. In 1990, this restriction was added as part of the
ethical rules. As the comment to the rule explains, Model Rule 3.8(f) is "intended
to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal
proceedings to those situations in which there is a genuine need to intrude into the
lawyer-client relationship.,
97
As originally adopted, the rule contained an additional limitation that barred a
prosecutor from issuing a subpoena to a lawyer without "obtain[ing] prior
judicial approval after an opportunity for an adversarial proceeding." This
requirement was intended to ensure "an independent determination that the
applicable standards are met."98 In 1995, however, following a federal court
ruling invalidating such a rule, this procedural requirement for prior judicial
approval was deleted. The rest of the rule was left intact.
ADOPTION OF RULE:. Rule 3.8(f) has been adopted, in some form, in the
following ten states: Alaska; Colorado; Louisiana; Massachusetts; North Caro-
lina; Oklahoma; Rhode Island; South Carolina; Tennessee; and Vermont.99 While
Virginia currently has such a provision in effect, it is destined to be eliminated as
of January 1, 2000, under revisions made this year to the Virginia ethical rules.100
LITIGATION OVER RULE: While there has been considerable litigation over rules
based on Model Rule 3.8(t) (or state-law precursors), it is important to emphasize
that the litigation has centered on the application of such rules to federal
prosecutors, rather than on the merits of such rules per se.
For at least a decade, the U.S. Department of Justice has actively sought to
challenge the application of rules containing attorney subpoena restrictions as
applied to federal prosecutors. This issue hasprimarily arisen when federal trial
courts have adopted, as their own rules of practice, state ethical rules containing
such restrictions. The results (and reasoning) have been mixed. The more recent
97. See MODEL RULES R. 3.8(e) cmt. 4.
98. See A Legislative History-The Development of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
1982-1998. NO pincite.
99. See ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuct R. 3.8(f) (including requirement for judicial approval); COLO.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8(f) (requirement for judicial approval later omitted); LA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (including requirement for judicial approval); MASS. RULEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(f)
(including requirement for judicial approval); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(e) (without requirement
for judicial approval); OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCT R. 3.8(f) (yariation on judicial approval requirement);
R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuctr R. 3.8(0 (without judicial approval requirement); S.C. RULES OF PROF'L
CoNDuCT R. 3.8(e) (without judicial approval requirement); TN. CODE OF PROF'L RESP., DR 7-103(C)
(including judicial approval requirement); VT. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuct R. 3.8(f) (without requirement for
judicial approval).
100. See VA. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT 3.8 and Commentary (adopted January 25, 1999, to become
effective January 1, 2000). The Commentary explains that the prior requirement contained in Virginia
Disciplinary Rule 8-102(A)(5), which prohibited the issuance of a subpoena to an attorney as a witness in a
criminal matter involving a present or former client without prior judicial approval, was deleted "because of
prevailing case law and judicial fiat (the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia) which
does not require same."
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trend, however, suggests that the courts will uphold the application of revised
Model Rule 3.8(f) to federal prosecutors (particularly given the passage of the
McDade Amendment).
In Baylson v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, for
example, the Third Circuit struck down a federal court rule requiring judicial
approval before a grand jury subpoena may be issued to an attorney because its
adoption "falls outside the local rule-making authority of the district court" and is
inconsistent with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.101 The Court focused,
in particular, on the "broad mechanism for pre-service judicial review of attorney
subpoenas" contained in the rule.
102
The Third Circuit's decision in Baylson decision, however, was in direct
conflict with the decision of the First Circuit addressing another, virtually
identical federal court rule. In United States v. Klubock, an equally divided court
sitting en banc affirmed the judgment of the district court upholding a federal
court rule requiring judicial approval before a grand jury subpoena may be issued
to an attorney. 10 3 That Court reasoned, in direct contrast, that the rule was "within
the rule-making power of the district court" and did not implicate any Supremacy
Clause concerns,'l4
The First Circuit affirmed the Klubock rule in subsequent cases, including
Whitehouse v. United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island,
another case involving a federal court rule requiring judicial approval for the
issuance of an attorney subpoena. 105 In Whitehouse, as in Klubock, the Court held
that federal court adoption of Rule 3.8(f) is "a legitimate exercise of the
rule-making authority of the United States District Court."' 0 6 A district court in
the First Circuit, similarly, recently upheld a federal court rule based on Model
Rule 3.8(f) (including the judicial approval requirement).10 7
The most recent precedent in this area was issued within the last two months by
the Tenth Circuit. That decision, in United States v. Colorado Supreme Court,10 8
is notable for two reasons. First, unlike the above decisions, it concerns a federal
court rule based on the amended version of Rule 3.8(f) (without the judicial
approval requirement). This is significant because this amendment makes more
clear that Rule 3.8(f) is intended to be an ethical rule, rather than a rule of
procedure. And second, the decision expressly applies the McDade Amendment.
Under these circumstances, the Tenth Circuit ruled that a federal court rule
101. 975 F.2d 102, 112 (3rd Cit. 1992). The Court also held, for similar reasons, that the Supremacy Clause
barred state ethics authorities from disciplining a federal prosecutor for violating such a rule. Id. at 113.
102. Id. at 108-09.
103. 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987).
104. Id. at 666-67.
105. 53 F.3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995).
106. Id. at 1365.
107. See Stem v. Supreme Judicial Court for Massachusetts, 184 F.R.D. 10 (D. Me. 1999).
108. 189 F.3d 1281, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20903 (10th Cit. Sept. 1, 1999),
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based on Colorado ethics Rule 3.8(1) is an ethical rule that properly "may be
enforced against federal prosecutors in Colorado."' 0 9 The Court emphasized, in
particular, that Rule 3.8(f) "in its current incarnation is a rule of ethics applicable
to federal prosecutors by the McDade Act,"" 0 rather than a "substantive or
procedural rule that is inconsistent with federal law.""'
While this decision does not entirely clarify matters, since it concerns solely
the prosecutor's power to issue a trial subpoena to an attorney, rather than a grand
jury subpoena," 2 it does suggest that, given the changes in Rule 3.8(f), and
equally important, in federal law, the courts are likely to look more favorably
than does the Baylson decision on the propriety of ethical rules placing limits on a
prosecutor's power to issue subpoenas to attorneys. 113
RATIONALE FOR THE RULE: The rationale for Rule 3.8(f) is amply described in
many of the litigated precedents.
This Rule arose out of observations, in the late 1980's, concerning the
"government's apparently increasing use of grand jury subpoenas on a target's
counsel, both pre- and post-indictment."' " 4 Despite the promulgation of Model
Rule 3.8(f), and despite the adoption by the U.S. Department of Justice of internal
restrictions on such subpoenas, by the mid-1990's, courts observed that "the
instances of federal prosecutors subpoening attorneys to compel evidence
regarding their clients have, nevertheless, continued to increase.' 15
The Ninth Circuit observed, in a passage quoted by other courts, that this
practice is roundly condemned:
The practice has been almost universally criticized by courts, commentators,
and the defense bar because it is viewed as a tool of prosecutorial abuse and as
an unethical tactical device US Attorneys employ to go on a 'fishing
expedition' with legal counsel without first pursing alternative avenues to get
the information." 6
In particular, the practice has been condemned because any benefit derived
from such subpoenas "comes at the direct expense of the attorney-client
relationship."117 Among other things, attorney subpoenas "chill the relationship
between the lawyer and client," create an "immediate conflict of interest for the
109. Id. at 1.
110. Id. at *19.
IIt. Id. at *5.
112. The district court had ruled that the federal court rule's restriction on grand jury subpoenas violated the
Supremacy Clause, but that part of the decision was not appealed. See 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS at * 3.
. 113. In Stem, similarly, the district court emphasized, among other things, that passage of the McDade
Amendment "signal[s] Congress's belief that ... the states and the federal courts play a greater role in
governing the conduct of government attorneys." 184 F.R.D. at 19.
114. United States v. Perry, 857 F.2d 1346, 1347 (9th Cir. 1988).
115. Whitehouse, 53 F.3d at 1352.
116. Id. See also, e.g., Whitehouse, 53 F.3d at 1355 n.8 (quoting Perry).
117. Perry, 857 E2d at 1347.
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attorney/witness," divert the attorney's "time and resources away from his
client," discourage attorneys "from providing representation in controversial
criminal cases," and "force attorneys to withdraw as counsel because of ethical
rules prohibiting an attorney from testifying against his client."'1
18
The Justice Department itself, as noted, has internal rules placing similar
restrictions on the issuance of grand jury subpoenas by federal prosecutors-
although as a voluntary measure, not an enforceable ethical restriction. 119 Similar
to Model Rule 3.8(f), these Guidelines require that
first, "the information sought shall not be protected by a valid claim of
privilege,"
second, "[a]ll reasonable attempts to obtain the information from alternative
sources shall have proved to be unsuccessful,"
third, "the information sought is reasonably needed for the successful
completion of the investigation or prosecution," and is not being "used to
obtain peripheral or speculative information,"
fourth, the "need for the information must outweigh the potential adverse
effects upon the attorney-client relationship," and
fifth, the "subpoena shall be narrowly drawn and directed at material
information regarding a limited subject matter and shall cover a reasonable,
limited period of time." 120
CURRENT CRITICISMS: Justice Department attorney Csontos, in his comments to
the Commission, urges that "there are strong policy reasons for reconsidering
Rule 3.8(f)." 1 21 Among other things, he argues that Rule 3.8(f) affords protection
even to "non-confidential communications," shifts the burden from the party
claiming the privilege to the prosecutor, allows blanket invocation of a privilege,
and creates a "need" standard that goes beyond mere relevance.1 22 He also argues
that "similar limitations do not apply across the board to subpoenas issued by all




Mr. Csontos also cites a 1992 law review article critical of Rule 3.8(f) by
118. Whitehouse, 53 F.3d at 1354; see also, e.g., Colorado Supreme Court, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20903 at
* 18 (an attorney subpoena "undermines the trust and openness so important to the attorney-client relationship"
and "opens a second front which counsel must defend with her time and resources"); GERSHMAN,
PROSECuTORiAL MliscoNoucr, § 3.2(h) (1998) ("One of the most controversial issues today is the use of
subpoenas directed at criminal defense attorneys to produce documents or testify in matters related to their
clients.").
119. See U.S. Attorneys' Manual, Title 9, § 9-13.410 (Guidelines for Issuing Grand Jury or Trial Subpoena
To Attorneys For Information Relating to the Representation of Clients).
120. Id. at 9-166.
121. Csontos Letter at 5.
122. Id. at4n. 4.
123. Id. at 5.
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Professor Fred Zacharias. 124 In the article, Professor Zacharias notes the
increasing trend toward attorney subpoenas, the "uniformly negative" response
by the bar and scholarly commentators, the "significant costs" to defense
attorneys, the "potential for prosecutorial abuse," and the "rampant" calls for
reform. 125 Professor Zacharias takes the position, however, that these evils can be
better addressed than through an ethical rule that mandates "pre-issuance judicial
review" of such subpoenas (for example, through a rule entitling a client to a
copy of the attorney's grand jury transcript). 12 6
Of these criticisms, perhaps the most compelling is that a similar rule does not
govern the issuance of subpoenas by defense counsel and in civil cases. On the
other hand, the prosecutor alone has the power to obtain the issuance of grand
jury subpoenas, which presents a particularly grave potential for abuses in this
area.
RECOMMENDATION: While Model Rule 3.8(f) has drawn heated and consistent
criticism from the Justice Department insofar as it applies to federal prosecutors,
the rationale for the rule has been strongly supported by the courts, the bar and
commentators. The amendment by the ABA, in 1995, to remove the requirement
for prior judicial approval for the issuance of an attorney subpoena removes from
the Rule the provision that arguably was more in the nature of a procedural rule
than an ethical restriction. As revised, Rule 3.8(f) is limited to addressing the
conduct of the prosecutor, and to ensuring that the prosecutor meet a certain
standard of belief before seeking to issue a subpoena for an attorney's testimony.
While the rule has not been widely adopted in the states, it has been recently
upheld, in its amended version, by a federal appeals court. All of these
considerations, taken together, suggest that there is no compelling reason for the
ABA now to reverse course and delete the provision from its Model Rules.
RULE 3.8(G) - COMMENTS HEIGHTENING PUBLIC CONDEMNATION
OF ACCUSED
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: ...
(g) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the
nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law
enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that
have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the
accused.
Model Rule 3.8(g) concerns the prosecutor's duty to avoid making unneces-
sary out-of-court statements that tend to heighten public condemnation of the
124. Id. at 5 (citing Zacharias, A Critical Look at Rules Governing Grand Jury Subpoenas of Attorneys, 76
MmN. L. REv. 917 (1992)).
125. 79 MmN. L. REv. 917, 921-24.
126. Id. at 943.
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accused. This provision was added to the Rule in 1994.
Commentary explains that the Rule was adopted in recognition that, "in the
context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can
create the additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused."
Thus, the prosecutor "can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate
law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public
opprobrium of the accused., 127 Model Rule 3.8(g) has been so far been adopted
in only a few states.128
RECOMMENDATION: While Justice Department Attorney Csontos notes that this
provision is "superfluous,"12 9 it has not drawn a great deal of criticism or
comment. There does not appear to be any compelling reason to. revisit Rule
3.8(g) at this time.
COMMENT [1] TO RULE 3.8 - APPLICATION OF RULE 3.3 TO GRAND JURY
Another current issue under ABA Model Rule 3.8 concerns the reference, in
Comment [1] to that Rule, to another rule, Rule 3.3, which concerns a lawyer's
obligation in ex paWe proceedings. Specifically, in discussing the prosecutor's
obligation under rules other than Rule 3.8, the Comment states that grand jury
proceedings are included in the ex pWe proceedings governed by Rule 3.3. 130
This is significant because Rule 3.3 provides that in an ex pgae proceeding,
unlike a normal adversary proceeding, the lawyer has an obligation to "inform
the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable to tribunal
to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse."1 31 Thus, this
reference in the Comment has been interpreted to mean that the prosecutor is
required to disclose to the grand jury, in seeking an indictment, all material facts
supportive of the defendant's innocence, as well as of the defendant's guilt.
In most of the states that have adopted Rule 3.8, the reference in Comment [1]
to Rule 3.3, and its application to grand jury proceedings, has also been
adopted.' 32 However, six states that have otherwise adopted Comment [1] have
127. MODEL RULEs R. 3.8 cmt. 5.
128. MAss. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.8(g); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCr R. 3.8(f); OKLA. RULES OF
PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(f).
129. Csontos Letter at 5.
130. Specifically, the portion of the Comment at issue states: "See also Rule 3.3(d), governing ex parte
proceedings, among which grand jury proceedings are included."
131. MODEL RULES R. 3.3(d).
132. See ALASKA RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDuer R. 3.8 cmt.; ARIz. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUC, ER 3.8 cmt.;
ARK. RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 3.8 cmt.; Ct. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt.; DEL. RULEs OF PROF'L
CoNDucr R. 3.8 cmt.; FLA. RULEs OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 3.8 cmt.; HAWAII RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 3.8
cmt. [1]; IND. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8 cmt.; KAN. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 3.8 cmt.; Ky. RuLEs
OF PROF'L CONDucr, SCR 3.130 (3.8) cmt. [1]; MD. RuLES OF PROF'L CONDuCr R. 3.8 cmt.; MICH. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDuT R. 3.8 cmt.; Miss. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt.; Mo. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDuCr R.
3.8 cmt.; N.H. RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt.; N.M. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16-308 cmt.; N.D.
RULEs OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8 cmt.; OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUcr R. 3.8 cmt. [1]; PA. RULEs OF PROF'L
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deleted this reference to grand jury proceedings. 133 In the District of Columbia,
Rule 3.8 itself has been amended to require expressly that "in presenting a case to
a grand jury," a prosecutor may not "fail to bring to the attention of the grand jury
material facts tending substantially to negate the existence of probable cause."' 34
Other states expressly address this issue in Rule 3.3(d) or the commentary
thereto. For example, in adopting recent changes to the Virginia ethical rules,
effective January 1, 2000, that state has added a Comment to Rule 3.3(d) stating
that ex pAx e proceedings "do not include grand jury proceedings."1 35 In some
states, the ex parte rule of Rule 3.3(d) is not included at all, and thus the issue is
simply not germane.
As a constitutional matter, it is clear that a prosecutorial practice to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury is not legally required. In United States v.
Williams, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor does not have a "binding
obligation" to present even "substantial" exculpatory evidence to a grand jury,
and refused to dismiss an indictment on this basis.136 The Court also went on to
emphasize its view that there is no reason that a prosecutor should be required to
present such evidence, since this would transform the function of the grand jury
from an accusatory to an adjudicatory body.
Notwithstanding the Williams decision, however, a number of ethical stan-
dards impose such a requirement. The NDAA's National Prosecution Standards,
for example, provide that the prosecutor "should disclose to the grand jury any
evidence which he knows will tend to negate guilt or preclude an indictment."'
137
The ABA's Prosecution Function Standards provide, similarly, that "no prosecu-
tor should knowingly fail to disclose to the grand jury evidence which tends to
negate guilt or mitigate the offense."'
138
Commentary to the ABA Standards explains the rationale for adopting a rule in
this area that consciously "goes beyond the minimum requirements of constitu-
tional law" set out by the Supreme Court in Williams:
[This Standard] follow[s] the general approach of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct by requiring prosecutors to make timely disclosure to the
CoNDuCr R. 3.3 cmt. 1 cmt.; R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8 cmt.; S.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8
cmt.; TEx. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.09 cmt. 1; UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 3.8 cmt.; W. VA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8 cmt.; Wis. RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDuCr, SCR 20: 3.8 cmt.; Wyo. RULES OF
PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8 cmt. 1.
133. See ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 3.8 cmt.; COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8 cmt.; D.C.
RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 3.8 cmt.; MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. [1]; MINN. RULES OF
PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8 cmt.; N.C. RULes OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 3.8 cmt. 1. In certain other states, no
comments are included with Rule 3.8 at all.
134. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 3.8(g).
135. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr 3.3(d) cmt. 14.
136. 504 U.S. 36 (1992)
137. NDAA, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, § 58.4 (2d ed. 1991).
138. ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard3-3.6(b) (3d ed. 1993).
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grand jurors of the same evidence that must be disclosed to the defense,
namely, all evidence known to the prosecutor tending to negate the guilt of the
accused or to mitigate the offense. For example, when a police officer has
seriously injured or killed a person in the line of duty, prosecutors often present
all available information and witnesses to the grand jury so that an evaluation
of probable cause can be made by an entity independent of the prosecutor. Such
a procedure enhances public confidence in the ultimate decision on whether to
prosecute. The obligation to present evidence that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused flows from the basic duty of the prosecutor to seek justice. 139
Similarly, the Justice Department itself, notwithstanding the Williams decision,
has adopted a policy that "when a prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry is
personally aware of substantial evidence that directly negates the guilt of a
subject of the investigation, the prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose
such evidence to the grand jury before seeking an indictment against such
person." 1
40
Justice Department attorney Csontos states that since evidence negating guilt
is not required to be brought to the attention of grand juries, "prosecutors should
not be threatened with discipline for failing to investigate further or to present all
theories advanced by the defense." He recommends that consideration be given
to one of the following: (1) amending Rule 3.3(d) to exclude grand jury
proceedings; (2) modifying the Comment to Rule 3.3(d) to say that the
presentation of evidence in grand jury proceedings is not affected by the rule; or
(3) removing the reference to Rule 3.3(d) in the Comment to Rule 3.8.'41
RECOMMENDATION: A clearer statement of the ABA Rules' position on the issue
of presenting exculpatory evidence to the grand jury is desirable, but should only
be done with input from all affected groups.
At present, the application of Rule 3.3 to grand jury proceedings is not
addressed in that Rule at all, but only in a fairly minimal reference in a Comment
to Rule 3.8. While most of the states include the reference to Rule 3.3 in their
Comment to Rule 3.8, it is not clear that this was done with a great deal of thought
to the issue. On the other hand, both the ABA and the NDAA have consciously
adopted the position that a prosecutor should present to the grand jury in seeking
an indictment evidence that is exculpatory to the defendant, given the prosecu-
139. Id., Commentary at 66-67.
140. UNITED STATES ArroNEys' MANuAL, § 9-11.233 (noting that violations of this policy may be referred
"to the Office of Professional Responsibility for review"). Notwithstanding the imposition of this requirement
on its attorneys as a matter of policy, the Justice Department has vigorously pressed in court to bar the
application of Rule 3.3(d) to federal prosecutors conducting grand jury proceedings. In United States v.
Colorado Supreme Court, 871 F. Supp. 1328 (D. Colo. 1994), the Department sought a declaration that Rule
3.3(d) was "null and void.as [it] pertain[s] to federal prosecutors in the performance of their federal duties." Id.
at 1328. That issue became moot, however, when in the middle of the litigation Colorado deleted the Comment
to Rule 3.8 that made Rule 3.3 applicable to grand jury proceedings. See United States v. Colorado Supreme
Court, 988 F Supp. 1368, 1369 (D. Colo. 1998).
141. Csontos Letter at 8.
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tor's sole access to this body and his or her duty to "do justice" rather than win a
case.
The fundamental question for the Commission is whether there is sufficient
reason, as Mr. Csontos has suggested, to revisit the existing ethical obligation,
and/or whether the obligation, even if retained, should be spelled out more clearly
(and more consistently between Rule 3.3 and Rule 3.8). The fact that the Williams
case holds that the failure to present the grand jury with exculpatory evidence is
not a basis for dismissal of an indictment cuts both ways. While Mr. Csontos
argues that this means that the requirement should be eliminated outright as an
ethical obligation, it could be argued equally that this demonstrates the need for
an ethical rule to provide the only meaningful sanction in this area (particularly
given the difficulty for anyone but the prosecutor of detecting when such a
violation has occurred).
The consistency of the position taken by standards in the area (including those
issued by a major prosecutors' organization) tends to suggest that this is an
important obligation which should continue to be included in the Rule-and if so,
spelled out explicitly, either in the Rule or in commentary. Given the controver-
sial nature of any amendment in this regard, however, it is an issue on which the
Commission should seek broader comment before making any proposal.
One potential compromise would be to take the position taken by the District
of Columbia rules, which recognize an obligation, but limit it to the obligation to
present to the grand jury "material facts tending substantially to negate the
existence of probable cause." Such a standard would be more limited than a
requirement to present "all" material facts, and would be more closely tied to
Rule 3.8(a), which prohibits the prosecutor from seeking the issuance of an
indictment absent probable cause. Such a change would require an amendment to
the black letter, however. On balance, the author believes that such an
amendment would be the best course.
Other alternatives would be: (a) To eliminate any reference to the grand jury
issue in either Rule. This would have the effect of leaving open the issue whether
a grand jury is an ex pane proceeding under Rule 3.3(d). (b) To clarify in the
commentary to Rule 3.3(d), as under current Rule 3.8, that ex pgne proceedings
include grand jury proceedings. This would ensure consistency between the two
rules without changing the Rules' current position. (c) To clarify in the
commentary to Rule 3.3(d) that ex paqe proceedings do not include grand jury
proceedings. This would require eliminating the reference outright in the
commentary to Rule 3.8, and would reverse the Rules' current position on this
issue. All three of these alternatives would affect the commentary only.
Finally, were the Commission to simply leave the commentary as is, .it would
leave the issue to the states for development.
[Vol. 22:427
THE STATE OF RULE 3.8
PART III: POTENTIAL AREAS OF CHANGE TO RULE 3.8
As noted, one criticism of Rule 3.8 is that it is incomplete in the obligations it
imposes. It has been pointed out, rightly, that some of the prosecutor's obligations
not detailed in the rule (such as the obligation not to deliberately avoid obtaining
evidence helpful to the defendant, recognized in many standards) are more
significant than some of the obligations that are included in Rule 3.8 (such as the
duty not to seek waiver of pretrial rights from an unrepresented defendant, which
will rarely come into play). 142
The commentary to Rule 3.8 addresses this to some extent, noting that
"applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing
disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion
could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4," the catch-all provision which makes it
unethical, among other things, to engage in conduct that is "prejudicial to the
administration of justice., 14 3 It is unquestionable that there are many important
obligations unique to the prosecutor's role that are not included in the rule as a
specific ethical obligation.
Some of the additional areas of prosecutorial misconduct that have been
recognized in the case law or in state ethical rules, but are not included in the
Model Rule are listed below. This list is not provided to suggest that any or all of
these restrictions or limitations be added to Rule 3.8, but to indicate the range of
issues presented in this area. Some additional ethical restrictions on prosecutors
reflected in state rules include:
" A prosecutor shall not "intentionally avoid the pursuit of evidence or
information because it may damage the prosecution's case or aid the
defense."144
" A prosecutor shall not, "in exercising discretion to investigate or to
prosecute, improperly favor or invidiously discriminate against any per-
son."
14 5
" A prosecutor shall not "peremptorily strike jurors on grounds of race,
religion, national or ethnic background, or sex.'
1 4 6
" A prosecutor shall not "conduct a civil or criminal case against any person
whom the lawyer represents or has represented as a client."'
' 47
142. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors 'Seek Justice?', 26 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 607, 616
(1999) (the disciplinary rules "do not address many areas of prosecutorial conduct").
143. MODEL RULES R. 8.4(d).
144. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(e); see also, e.g., VT. CODE PROF. REsP. EC 7-13; TENN. CODE OF
PROF. REsp. EC 7-13; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRBIINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FuNcTION, Standard 3-3.11 (c) (3d
ed. 1993).
145. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRUIMNAL JUSTICE,
PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.1(b) (3d ed. 1993).
146. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(h).
147. ME. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(i)(3).
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" A prosecutor "shall not conduct a civil or criminal case against any person
relative to a matter in which the lawyer represents or has represented the
complaining witness." 1
4 8
" A prosecutor shall "not assert personal knowledge of the facts at issue, except
when testifying as a witness."'
149
" A prosecutor shall "not assert a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause,
as to the credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to
the guilt or innocence of an accused; but the prosecutor may argue, on
analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to the
matters stated herein."
1 50
* A prosecutor shall "not knowingly take advantage of an unrepresented
defendant."'
' 5 1
Similarly, there are a number of additional prosecutorial obligations not
contained in Rule 3.8, but recognized in the case law, in standards, or other
sources. These include, for example:
" A prosecutor "should not attempt to utilize the charging decision only as a
leverage device in obtaining guilty pleas to lesser charges.'
1 52
" A prosecutor "should not file charges for the purpose of obtaining from a
defendant a release of potential civil claims against victims, witnesses, law
enforcement agencies, and their personnel, or the prosecutor and his
personnel."' 15
3
" A prosecutor "should not knowingly use illegal means to obtain evidence or
employ or instruct or encourage others to use such means."'
54
" A prosecutor "should not discourage or obstruct communication between
prospective witnesses and defense counsel." 1
55
" A prosecutor "should not advise any person or cause any person to be advised
to decline to give to the defense information which such person has the right
to give."'
156
" A prosecutor "should not make statements or arguments in an effort to
influence grand jury action in a manner which would be impermissible at trial
before a petit jury."'' 5 7
148. ME. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.7(i)(4).
149. MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(h).
150. ME. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(i).
151. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.8(b) (to take effect January 1, 2000).
152. NDAA, NATIONAL PROSECUTnON STANDARDS, § 43.4 (2d ed. 1991).
153. NDAA, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, § 43.5 (2d ed. 1991).
154. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCION, Standard 3-3.1(c) (3d ed. 1993).
155. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIPOINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.1(d) (3d ed. 1993).
156. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.1(d) (3d ed. 1993).
157. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNcTION, Standard 3-3.5(b) (3d ed. 1993); see
also NDAA, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, § 60.3 (2d ed. 1991).
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eIf a prosecutor "believes that a witness is a potential defendant, the
prosecutor should not seek to compel the witness's testimony before the
grand jury without informing the witness that he or she maybe charged."' 158
* A prosecutor "should not condition a dismissal of charges, nolle prosequi, or
similar action on the accused's relinquishment of the right to seek civil
redress unless the accused has agreed to the action knowingly and intelli-
gently, freely and voluntarily, and where such waiver is approved by the
court." 
1 5 9
Finally, in the academic literature, additional potential amendments to Rule 3.8
have been proposed and debated. These include, for example, proposals to
include in the Rule a provision requiring that prosecutors avoid not only
impropriety but also conduct that has the "appearance of impropriety. ' 16°
Similarly, while not directed at revisions to Rule 3.8, Senator Hatch's proposed
legislation (discussed above in connection with attempts to overturn the McDade
Amendment) would have added ethical limitations on the conduct of federal
prosecutors not contained in Rule 3.8, including, for example, rules that a
prosecutor may neither "attempt to corruptly influence or color a witness's
testimony with the intent to encourage untruthful testimony" nor "offer or
provide sexual activities to any government witness or potential witness in
exchange for or on account of his or her testimony," as well as a rule that a
prosecutor may not "violate a defendant's right to discovery."
161
Again, these descriptions are not provided to suggest that all of these
obligations should be ethical restrictions in Rule 3.8, but simply to indicate the
wide range of recognized prosecutorial obligations that are not contained in the
Rule. As this demonstrates, a full-scale review of Rule 3.8 would require
considerable thought, research, and solicitation of comments from a broad range
of interests.
RECOMMENDATION: Any significant change in Rule 3.8 is certain to provoke
substantial debate and controversy. Equally important, to be effective, any
changes that are made will require the participation and support of many different
constituencies in the criminal justice community. Therefore, before the Commis-
sion undertakes any major revision of Rule 3.8, if it is inclined to do so, it should
initiate a process that will include, at a minimum, participation and input from
those groups within the ABA with expertise in criminal justice, federal and state
prosecuting authorities and public defenders, defenders' and prosecutors' associa-
tions on the federal and state level, standard-setting bodies, and trial and appellate
158. ABA STANDARDs FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.6(d) (3d ed. 1993).
159. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTON FuNCTION, Standard 3-3.9(g) (3d ed. 1993).
160. See, e.g., Roberta K. Flowers, What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of Impropriety
Standard to Prosecutors, 63 Mo. L. REv. 699, 736 (1998) (proposing that an "Appearance of Impropriety
Standard should be included in Rule 3.8").
161. See S. 250.
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judges in courts handling criminal matters. It may be that such a project is beyond
the scope, or timing, for the Commission given its already ambitious goals and
agenda.
